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FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1979
MERLIN G. BRINER*
INTRODUCTION
F EDERAL INCOME TAx DEVELOPMENTS: 1979 is the seventh of an an-
nual series of articles to be published in the AKRON LAW REVIEW. The
scope of this survey is limited to the substantive developments in the field of
income taxation. The thrust of this article is not only to identify new de-
velopments, but also to trace these concepts through their formulative
changes.
Given the volatile nature of taxation, it is crucial for the partitioner
in this field to remain current with the changes which have occurred during
the year. Research of this article includes cases decided through December
1, 1979.
In an attempt to minimize the lead time between research and pub-
lication, this author has engaged the most able assistance of several mem-
bers of the AKRON LAW REVIEW. Without their substantial contributions
and complete dedication, this article would not have been possible. The
author, therefore, wishes to recognize and thank the following members
of the AKRON LAW REVIEW, for their efforts in researching, writing and
compiling this article: James C. Ellerhorst, William G. Frantz, Thomas
Gasce, William Healey III, Linda L. Robison, Michael P. Swanson, Alan
Tobin, and Lois Yoder. Special appreciation is extended to William G.
Frantz and Linda L. Robison.
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L00 Income
1.01 Meal Allowances - Refunds
New Revenue Procedure 79-131 allows refunds to some officers who
were assessed for a tax deficiency for meal allowances received between
1970 and 1976.
On November 29, 1977, in Commissioner v. Kowalski,2 the Supreme
Court held that cash meal allowance payments received by state police
officers were not excludable from gross income under section 119.1 The
Revenue Act of 1978 barred retroactive application of that decision." Re-
funds are available for officers who did not utilize the meal allowance ex-
clusion in 1977.
Now Revenue Procedure 79-131 allows refunds to officers who did
not report the allowances on their tax returns in taxable years 1970 through
1976, but who were later assessed a deficiency by the IRS for the amount
of the subsistence allowance. Refunds will be allowed despite the fact that
the statute of limitations will have run. Claims must be filed on or before
April 16, 1979. Only officers who did not include the allowance within
gross income on their originally filed tax form will get the benefit of Revenue
Procedure 79-13.1
1.02 Scholarship
Traditionally, resident physicians and medical interns have not been
allowed to exempt amounts received from hospitals or other medical centers
during the residency or internship even though the work provides a valu-
able learning experience and is required for completion of the medical
studies.f
In Burstein v. United States,8 the taxpayer was accepted in the Resi-
dency Training Program of the Graduate School of Medicine of the Univer-
sity of New Mexico. He received a $300-per-month fellowship and was
1 10 I.R.B. 27 (1979).
2434 U.S. 77 (1977).
sSee Int. Rev. Code of 1954. All subsequent references to code sections are to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 unless otherwise indicated.
' Pub. L No. 95-427, § 3, 92 Stat. 997 (1978).
5 10 I.R.B. at 27.
aid.
'See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 72-469, 1972-2 C.B. 79; Rev. Rul. 57-386, 1957 - 2 C.B. 107; Rev. Rul.
70-283, 1970-1 C.B. 26.
s43 A.F.T.R. 2d 1132 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
Fall, 1979]
3
et al.: Federal Income Tax Developments: 197
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1980
AKRON LAW REviEW
employed at a salary of $437 per month. Evidence showed that about eight
hours a week were spent at lectures and other purely educational activities.
Under these facts, the court found that the $300 per month was primarily
for taxpayer's education and training and was therefore excludable under
section 117(g) (2). Additionally, the court found that the use of the resi-
dents was a financial detriment to the hospital and that residents did not
provide additional patient care.
The important differences between Burstein and prior decisions9 are:
(1) separate payments were made as fellowship grant and as salary; (2)
the hospitals had concurrent purposes of patient care and medical education,
and the intent of the grant payment was educational; (3) a definite part
of the resident's activities were educational and another part was both edu-
cation and a service to patients; and (4) a division between the number of
hours spent in education and in services to patients is possible.
1.03 Travel - Wives
The Internal Revenue Service has followed the position taken by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Central Illinois Public Service Co.
v. United States,"0 by ruling that convention expenses incurred by an insur-
ance company on behalf of its employee's wives are not wages for purposes
of withholding under section 340(a). 1  Prior to Central Illinois the Service
ruled in Revenue Ruling 70-8512 that cash allowances or reimbursement
for meals paid to state police troopers on regular duty were subject to
withholdings. Also, in Revenue Ruling 75-279" the Service maintained
that amounts paid for meals eaten by railroad employees on stops which
were not made to obtain substantial sleep or rest constituted wages subject
to withholding. Central Illinois abrogated that position by holding that re-
imbursement of lunch expenses of employees on non-overnight company
travel did not constitute wages subject to withholding.
Section 3401.6 defines wages as a "remuneration for services per-
formed." Treasury Regulation 31.3401(a)-1(g)(2) requires that in order
for amounts paid as reimbursement for convention expenses to be treated
as nonwage items and thus not subject to section 3402 requirements, the
amount must be shown to have been specifically paid "either as advances or
reimbursement for traveling or other bona fide, ordinary, and necessary
expenses incurred or reasonably expected to be incurred in the business
of the employer." In determining whether payments will be treated as re-
imbursement for expenses or remuneration for services, the courts held in
9 See, e.g., Hof v. Comm'r, 48 T.C.M. (P-H) 79055 (1979); and, Hemtree v. United
States, 464 F.2d 1262 (4th Cir. 1972).
10435 U.S. 21 (1978).
"
1 See, Letter Ruling 7921015 (1979).
12 1970-1 C.B. 214.
10 1975-2 C.B. 409.
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Peoples Life Ins. Co. v. United States" and Acacia Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
United States15 that the test will be to determine the interest of the em-
ployer. The employer must be able to show that the purpose of the payments
was to reimburse the employee for expenses and not to reward him for
performance of his work.
In response to Letter Ruling 791015, the Service has now accepted
that reimbursements for expenses do not per se constitute section 3401
wages. However, the Service has not accepted the test applied by the courts
in Peoples and Acacia. Under the Internal Revenue Service test, all the
facts and circumstances must be considered.
In Letter Ruling 791015, the facts revealed that wives of the insurance
salesmen were encouraged and expected to attend scheduled activities
with their husbands. The attendance record of a salesman's wife was a factor
considered in promotion decisions because the company perceived the wives
as a valuable ingredient to the salesmen's success as they often assist their
husbands. Examining the purpose of the employer's practice of requiring
participation by the wives together with all the facts, the Service con-
cluded that the payments were truly for expenses incurred and not remuner-
ation for their services.
1.04 Self-Employment Tax - Independent Contractors
A new private letter ruling imposes self-employment tax on the fees
paid to a retired executive who acts as an independent consultant to his
former firm.' In this private ruling, the Service states that under the facts
set forth it will not follow the decision in Barrett v. Commissioner.' In
Barrett a retired employee received fees under a consulting contract with
his former employer. The Tax Court found that these fees were not subject
to self-employment tax because the taxpayer was not engaged in offering
his services as a consultant to firms other than his former employers.
Under the current statutory test, independent contractor status may
exist whenever the person for whom the services are performed does not
control or retain the right to control or direct the individual who performs
the services. Treating a worker as an independent contractor not only re-
lieves the taxpayer of federal payroll taxes but it also relieves him of state
payroll taxes, such as unemployment compensation insurance, and work-
men's compensation insurance. A worker can also benefit from being classi-
fied as an independent contractor. Although the percentage applicable to
the SECA tax is approximately one and one-half times the employees share
of FICA tax, FICA is paid on full wages, whereas the SECA tax is ap-
14 373 F.2d 924 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
15 272 F. Supp. 188 (D. Md. 1967).
16 Letter Ruling 7912055 (1979).
17 58 T.C. 284 (1972) acq. "in result only," Rev. Rul. 1974-2 C.B. 1.
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plicable only to net income from self employment. Independent contractors
are treated as self-employed and payments to them are not subject to
withholding."
Not all income earned by an independent contractor qualifies as net
earnings from self-employment, which amount is used to determine self-
employment tax and Keogh plan deductions. There is a pecularity in the
definition of self-employment earnings which makes it possible for a self-
employed person to receive payment for services that isn't subject to either
social security tax or self-employment tax, but which doesn't bar social
security benefits. Congress defined the net earnings from self-employment
to which the self-employment tax applies, as meaning gross income de-
rived from any trade or business carried on by such individual. Thus, unless
an independent contractor's earnings flow from a trade or business, these
earnings are not subject to the self employment tax. In Gentile v. Com-
missioner,9 the court said that the key factor in determining whether a per-
son is carrying on a trade or business is whether an individual holds one's
self out to others as engaged in the selling of goods or services. Following
this reasoning, the IRS in a private letter ruling"0 cited Gentile to the effect
that continuity and regularity, together with the profit motive, are not
sufficient to show that an activity constitutes a trade or business for pur-
poses of section 162, unless the taxpayer is found to be holding himself
out as offering goods or services to others.
If a retired executive acts as an independent consultant to his former
firm, he will be subject to self-employment tax on his earnings only if such
consulting fees qualify as net earnings from self-employment. Barrett held
that fees received by a retired employee pursuant to a consulting contract
with his former employer were not subject to self-employment tax be-
cause the taxpayer was not offering his consultant services to others in
addition to his former employer. However, in Letter Ruling 7912055, the
IRS definitely asserted the position that the Service will not follow the
Barrett decision. This private ruling concerned an agreement between a
major shareholder of a corporation and his corporation providing for the
shareholder to render consulting services to his firm upon retirement. Ad-
ditionally, he agreed not to engage in any business which might directly or
indirectly be competitive with the corporation. The IRS, in finding his
work to be a trade or business reasoned that merely because he is per-
forming services exclusively for one firm does not, of itself, signify that
such person is not carrying on a trade or business. Such an interpretation
clouds the future of the relief of self-employment tax for the retired con-
IsTo curtail noncompliance by independent contractors, the Administration proposes that
a flat rate of ten percent be withheld from payments made in the course of trade or business
for services provided by an independent contractor.
1965 T.C. 1 (1975).
20 Letter Ruling 7904059 (1979).
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sultant and most certainly invites litigation in this interim period of divisive-
ness between the Service and the Tax Court.
1.05 State Income Tax Refunds
The IRS recently issued Revenue Ruling 79-1521 which clarifies the
effect of the zero bracket amount on the portion of the state income tax
refund that must be reported as income on a subsequent year's tax return.
This situation was controlled prior to 1977 by Revenue Ruling 56-
447' which has now become obsolete. Revenue Ruling 56-447 was en-
acted to clarify the "tax-benefit rule," which states that only when the re-
fund results in a tax benefit to the taxpayer, must it later be reported as
income when refunded.2
The person who used the standard deduction was allowed to exclude
the entire amount of refund from income as there was no tax benefit in
the year the refund was received. Prior to enactment of the zero bracket
amount [z.b.a.] in 1977, a taxpayer who itemized his deductions was per-
mitted to deduct all of his itemized deductions from income and therefore
would receive a tax benefit from any refund.
But in tax years after 1976, the z.b.a. was enacted and created a floor
($3,200 for married filing joint, $1,600 for married filing separately, and
$2,200 for single taxpayers) must be substracted from the total itemized
deductions and allowed only the excess over the floor amount to be actually
deducted from Adjusted Gross Income. This created a problem when the
taxpayer did not have enough itemized deductions to exceed the floor with-
out the use of the state taxes paid during the year, but later gets a refund
of a portion or all of the state taxes.
Example: Taxpayer has Adjusted Gross Income of $10,000 and itemized
deductions of $2,000 plus state taxes of $1,000. His z.b.a. amount for
ductions of $2,000 plus state taxes of $1,000. His z.b.a. amount for
a single individual is $2,200 (this amount is increased to $2,400 for
tax years after 1978). Without the use of his state taxes, taxpayer would
take the standard deduction and have taxable income of $10,000.
But with the use of the state taxes, he would have $2,500 of itemized
deductions less the $2,200 floor gives him excess itemized deductions
of $300. This would leave him with taxable income of $9,700. So
the tax benefit from the use of $500 of state taxes is only $300.
The Internal Revenue Service allows the first $200 of refund to be
excluded from income since no benefit was derived from it.
Revenue Ruling 79-152' allows the taxpayer to take the deduction
21 1979-3 I.R.B. 5.
22 1956-2 C.B. 102.
23ld.
24 1979-3 I.R.B. 5.
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currently and exclude the portion of the refund which brought the total
itemized deductions up to the zero bracket amount or the amount which
actually resulted in a benefit.
1.06 Constructive Receipt
In Congleton v. Commissioner,"' the taxpayer received compensation
under a plan whereby the board of directors of the W. T. Congleton Co.,
Inc. would authorize a salary amount to be paid taxpayer and deduct
the amounts from the corporation's income. Using the accrual method of
accounting the corporation would deduct the amounts in the taxable year
in which they were authorized regardless of when they were actually paid
out. The Tax Court held that the "doctrine of constructive receipt" applied.
During the years in question, taxpayer was the president and a mem-
ber of the board of directors of W. T. Congleton Co., Inc. As president,
he could sign checks to be drawn against corporate checking accounts
with no countersignature. He would typically withdraw amounts of cash
from the corporate funds sufficient to cover living expenses for the year
in which the salary was authorized. He would then withdraw the balance
in the following year. By reporting income under the cash receipts and
disbursements method, the taxpayer would then report the amounts as in-
come in the year received.
Under this plan, the taxpayer had been authorized to receive a salary
of $62,500 in February of 1972 and $64,500 in January of 1974. Taxpayer
only withdrew $2,500 of the $62,000 in 1972, withdrawing the balance
of $60,000 on March 6, 1973, and he did not withdraw any of the
$64,500 until March 15, 1975, enabling him to defer recognition of in-
come for a year. The Tax Court accepted the Commissioner's view and
determined that Congleton constructively received salary income of $60,000
in 1972 and $64,500 in 1974.2'
In 1949 the Second Circuit decided in Hyland v. Commissioner," that
an eighty-five percent officer-stockholder did not constructively receive in-
come merely because of his control of the corporation. A $40,000 salary
had been authorized, but Hyland had taken no steps to withdraw the
amounts in the year of authorization. Mere possession of the power to make
the funds available did not constitute constructive receipt without any in-
dication of an intent to exercise such power.
Treasury Regulation 1.451-2(a) abrogated that decision by determin-
ing that income is constructively received in the taxable year during which
it is credited to a taxpayer's account, set apart for him, or otherwise made
available so that he could have drawn upon it during the taxable year if
28 48 T.C.M. (P-H) 79,130 (1979).
2H Id. at 557.
27 175 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1949).
[Vol. 13:2
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notice of the intention to withdraw had been given. Relying on Regula-
tion 1.451-2(a) in Benes v. Commissioner," the Tax Court held that the
taxpayer constructively received income for salary authorized but not re-
ceived. The keys to the court's holding included the findings that taxpayer
as president of Benes Co. had full power and authority, alone, to write
the checks on the company's bank account and that the company had ade-
quate cash available." In Hurty v. United States,3 the Court of Claims
treated the taxpayer, as having constructively received income even though
the accrual was not made to the taxpayer's individual account. The con-
trolling factor was the finding that the taxpayer was in control of the cor-
poration and therefore in a position to receive the amount whenever he
wished.n
In the instant case, the taxpayer was situated similarly to the tax-
payers in Benes and Hurtz. He maintained effective control of the corpo-
ration and retained full powers to withdraw from the corporate accounts.
The Tax Court's holding that Congleton constructively received income
is consistent with recent court holdings.
The harshness of this decision can be avoided. In Revenue Ruling
75-180," a taxpayer proved that his salary did not become an obligation
of the corporation until late in the year. At that time, it was impractical
to withdraw the amount. Therefore, taxpayer was not in constructive re-
ceipt of income.
Thus, it appears that the doctrine of constructive receipt will apply
to an officer-stockholder if the corporation incurs the salary obligation
before the end of the year which is reflected in an accrual on its books,
the income is made available for the officer-stockholder to withdraw, and
the overall financial condition of the corporation is such that it can make
the payments.
1.07 Earned Income - Writing Bail Bonds
In Bruno v. Commissioner," the Tax Court held that for purposes of
section 1348, capital was not a material income-producing factor in tax-
payer's business of writing bail bonds. The taxpayer was required to meet
certain prescribed conditions before she could write bail bonds in state
and municipal courts. The state required that a surety's bond must be
supported by real or personal property. Local ordinances required a $15,000
deposit of cash, negotiable securities, or some combination thereof, with
the director of finance to be able to write bonds before the municipal court.
28 42 T.C. 358 (1964), atrd 335 F.2d 929.
29 42 T.C. at 381.
30 12 A.F.T.R. 2d 5144 (Ct. C1. 1963).
32 Id. at 5153.
3" 1975-1 C.B. 142.
U7t T.C. No. 17, 71 Tax Ct. Rep. IDr, (P-H) $ 71.17 (1978).
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Dorothy Bruno sought to apply the maximum tax on earned income
under section 1348 to the entire net profits from her bail bonding busi-
ness. The Commissioner asserted that capital is a material income-producing
factor in taxpayer's bail bonding business, thereby reducing the amount of
available earned income that will qualify for the benefits of section 1348.
For taxable years beginning before 1977, the fifty percent rate ceiling
of section 1348 applied to earned income rather than personal service
income. Personal service income consists of any income that qualifies as
earned income under section 911, plus amounts received as a pension
or annuity which arise from an employer-employee relationship or from
tax deductible contributions to a retirement plan. Personal service income
includes any income which is earned income within the meaning of section
401(c)(2)(c) and section 911(b). In Bruno, the Tax Court determined
that earned income for purposes of section 1348 and this case, would be
controlled by section 911 (b).
The amount of income from a taxpayer's trade or business in which
both personal services and capital are material income-producing factors
is subject to a special limitation. Such earned income is limited to "rea-
sonable allowance as compensation for personal services rendered by the
taxpayer." For taxable years beginning before 1979, the reasonable allow-
ance as compensation for personal services rendered by the taxpayer could
not exceed thirty percent of the taxpayer's share of the net profits of such
trade or business. Section 1348 has now been amended so that for taxable
years beginning after December 31, 1978, "section 911 (b) shall be applied
without regard to the phrase, not in excess of 30 percent of his share of the
net profits of such trade or business."
In Bruno, the parties agreed that Regulation 1.1348-3 (a) (3) (ii) would
furnish the test to determine whether capital is a material income-producing
factor in a business. The Regulation prescribes a test for determining wheth-
er capital is a material income-producing factor based upon the form
of the income received and the nature of the business.
The Tax Court regarded taxpayer's capital investment as merely inci-
dental to her bail bonding business. The income consisted principally of reve-
nue derived from the sale of services, and the taxpayer's ability to render
continuous service that she sold and from which she derives business in-
come was primary. The taxpayer's business obligation was to produce the
accused for trial and the capital used in her business was merely incidental
to her professional services.34
1.08 Split Dollar Life Insurance
Under a split dollar life insurance policy, the employer pays the por-
34 71 Tax Ct. Rep. Dec. (P-H) at 113.
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tion of the premiums equal to the increase in the cash surrender value
and the employee pays the balance. When the employee (insured) dies,
the employer receives an amount equal to the funds it has provided, which
represents the cash surrender value and the employee's beneficiary receives
the balance. The value of the insurance protection in excess of the premiums
paid by the employee must then be included in the employee's income. 5
But both the employer and the employee's beneficiary are entitled to treat
their portions as tax exempt life insurance proceeds. The same income tax
result follows if the transaction is cast in some other form that results in
a similar benefit to the employee. 6
In practical effect, although the employee must pay a substantial por-
tion of the premium in the first year or two, his share of the premium de-
creases rapidly and may even be eliminated after a few years. The employer
gets no deduction for his premium payments under a split-dollar arrange-
ment since the employer is directly or indirectly a beneficiary under the
policy. The employee will be taxed annually only on the amount equal
to the one-year term insurance cost of the declining life insurance protection
to him, less any portion of the premium he pays."'
In Revenue Ruling 78-420,11 the Internal Revenue Service considered
two transactions that resulted in benefits to the employee that were held
to be similar to a "split-dollar" arrangement. In the first situation, the em-
ployer paid that part of the premium that covered the increase in cash
surrender value on a policy covering a retired employee. The taxpayer-em-
ployee, the son of the retired employee, had the right to name the bene-
ficiary. The arrangement here arose from the employer-employee relationship
between the taxpayer and the corporation. The arrangement was the type
contemplated in Revenue Ruling 64-328, since the taxpayer received an
economic benefit by not having to pay the total premium.
In the second situation, the corporation and the wife of the taxpayer
entered a similar arrangement. The policy covered the taxpayer and the
wife had the right to name the beneficiary. The corporation paid the
portion of the premium that covered the increase in the cash surrender
value. The corporation had the right to receive out of the proceeds of the
policy an amount equal to the cash surrender value of the policy, or at
least an amount equal to the funds it provided for premium payments.
This situation is again within purview of Revenue Ruling 64-328.
1.09 Automobile Rebates
Three years ago, purchasers of new automobiles pondered whether
35 Rev. Rul. 64-328, 1964-2 C.B. 11.
aeid.
87 Id.
38 1978-2 C.B. 67.
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they had to include as taxable income the rebates received from automobile
manufacturers. Today, this question is again: confronting taxpayers who
have bought certain Chrysler models and are receiving rebates from Chrys-
ler and, in some instances, the local dealer. The Service, in Revenue Ruling
76-96, 39 stated that a rebate received from the manufacturer or dealer by
a retail customer who negotiates at arm's length with a dealer on the purch-
ase or lease of a new automobile has not received taxable income. But
the Service has still refused to rule on other types of rebates, such as those
received from an employer or other concern, and the Internal Revenue
Service might view these as taxable income.
2.00 Deductions
2.01 Prepaid Feed Expenses
Rev. Rul. 79-22940 provides a new interpretation of the requirements
for taking a current deduction for prepaid feed expenses which will result
in stricter scrutiny of such investments. Investment-oriented groups, who
are looking at livestock-feeding operations which utilize prepaid feed as
a tax shelter, may not obtain a current deduction.
Revenue Ruling 75-152,41 which has been superseded and amplified
by the current ruling, set out a three-pronged test for determining the de-
ductibility of prepaid feed costs. The test has not been changed, but the
new interpretation of the test indicates that tax shelter investors will have
a more difficult time in meeting its requirements. The three requirements
of the prepaid feed cost test include:
1. The feed expenditure must be a payment for the purchase of feed
rather than a deposit on feed to be obtained in the future;
2. There must be a business purpose for the payment and tax avoid-
ance is not sufficient to satisfy this test; and,
3. The deduction of feed cost in the year of the prepayment may not
result in a material distortion of income.
In determining whether a material distortion of income has occurred,
the Service will consider the useful life of the resulting assets during and
beyond the taxable year paid, the materiality of the expenditure in relation
to the taxpayer's income for the year, and the customary, legitimate business
practices of the taxpayer in conducting the live-stock operations; the amount
of expenditure in relation to past purchases and the timing of the ex-
penditure as well as whether the taxes paid by the taxpayer who consistently
deducts prepaid feed costs are reasonable and comparable to the taxes that
would have been paid by the same taxpayer had he consistently not paid
in advance.
39 1976-1 C.B. 23.
40 1979-31 I.R.B. 6.
41 1975-1 C.B. 144.
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The taxpayer is a tax shelter investor when he only has an interest in
the prepaid feed and not in other assets, as distinguished from a traditional
farmer who has a significant capital investment in agricultural assets in
addition to the prepaid feed. The typical transaction involves the situation
where the prepaid feed is pledged as security to purchase the cattle to be
fed. Where this is the situation, the Service indicates that it will look care-
fully at the substantive purpose behind the transaction to determine whether
or not the motive is based on a valid business purpose or is simply a federal
income tax avoidance technique.
Finally, where a material distortion of income is shown, the Service will
exercise its broad administrative authority through the timing discretion
provided in sections 446(b), 451 and 461 to determine that the use of the
cash or accrual method of accounting does not provide a clear reflection
of income and that therefore the taxpayer may not take a deduction in the
taxable year in which it was paid for feed to be consumed by livestock in
later years. This revenue ruling is not designed to affect either section 447
requiring certain farming corporations to compute taxable income on the
accrual method of accounting or section 464 dealing with farming syndicates.
2.02 Depreciation - Shopping Centers
A building and its structural components may either be depreciated as
a unit based on a composite depreciation life or it may be depreciated
separately based on the depreciation life of the building shell and each
separate component. The Tax Court in University City, Inc. v. Commission-
er," followed the Internal Revenue Service in its redetermination of the
useful life of a shopping center building and the various components.
The taxpayer allocated the costs of construction to the various major
components and gave each one a separate useful life for depreciation based
on the life of its subcomponent with the shortest useful life. The Internal
Revenue Service determined that most of the components costs should be
allocated to the building itself, and accepted the useful life claimed for the
remaining components. The taxpayer also originally claimed a forty year
useful life for the building shell and has now modified it to thirty years,
while the IRS determined it to be forty-five years.
The taxpayer had contended that due to economic obsolescence, the
various components should have a shorter useful life on which to base
depreciation. The court noted that Regulation 1.167(a)-9 allows economic
obsolescence to be taken into consideration, but "it must be shown that
the property in question is or will be affected by economic conditions that
will result in its being abandoned at a date prior to the end of its useful
life.""3 The taxpayer failed to meet this burden and the court felt that
the taxpayer's case was founded on hypothesis.
- 1979 T.C.M. (P-H) 79,198 (1979).
4 Id.
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The Tax Court also rejected the taxpayer's attempt to modify its de-
termination of the useful life of the building down to thirty years. The
taxpayer argued that because of problems with parking, the inability to
expand, and the increase in competition, the economic life of the shopping
center had been reduced. The court relied upon the earlier decision of
Rimmerman v. Commissioner" to reject this argument and say that loss
of economic advantage alone is not enough to support a downward ad-
justment in useful life.
3.00 Exemptions
3.01 Dependency Exemptions - Medicare Benefits
The Service, having adopted the view of the Second Circuit in Ture-
camo v. Commissioner,45 now permits taxpayers to disregard Part A basic
medicare benefits when computing the support requirement for claiming
dependents." Sections 15(e) and 152(a) allow a dependency exemption
to be claimed when the taxpayer has provided more than one-half of an-
other individual's total support for the tax year.
Prior to Revenue Ruling 79-173,"' Revenue Ruling 70-341" was
controlling in this area and required basic medicare benefits received under
Part A of title XVIII of the Social Security Act,"' which benefits covered
hospital care, to be considered as part of the potential dependent's con-
tributions to his own support. However, similar benefits from private in-
surance programs and from Part B medicare benefits-which cover doctor
care-were excluded from the total. The Second Circuit in Turecamo re-
jected the idea that Part A medicare benefits were distinguishable from
both Part B benefits and from private insurance benefits. The Second Cir-
cuit held that all three benefit forms were to be treated similarly and not
to be included in calculating the total contributions made by the dependent
to his own support.
To this extent, Revenue Ruling 79-17350 revokes Revenue Ruling
70-341.51
3.02 Retired Employees - FICA and FUTA Exemptions
The IRS has issued two recent Letter Rulings5 2 which clarify the
amounts exempt from FICA and FUTA taxes based on sections 3121 and
3306. Sections 3121(a)(3) and 3306(b)(3) relieve the employee and
4,67 T.C. 94 (1976).
45 554 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1977).
" Rev. Rul. 79-173, 1979-23 I.R.B. 6.
4? Id.
48 1970-2 C.B. 31.
4941 U.S.C. § 1395C-1395i-2 (1976).
50 23 I.R.B. at 6.
512 C.B. at 31.
52 Letter Rulivs 7916028 (1979) and 7848051 (1978).
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employer of any liability for social security taxes (FICA) or federal un-
employment taxes (FUTA), respectively, by eliminating from the definition
of FICA and FUTA wages, payments "made to an employee (including
any amount paid by an employer for insurance or annuities, or into a fund,
to provide for any such payment) on account of retirement."
Additionally, provision under these sections was made for exclusion from
the definition of FICA or FUTA wages, payments (other than vacation or
sick pay) made to an employee reaching a certain age if the employee does
"not work for the employer in the period for which such payment is made."
Section 3121 (a) (9) sets the age at 62 for purposes of FICA taxes and
section 3306(a) (8) sets the age at 65 for purposes of FUTA taxes. Treas-
ury Regulations 31.3121 (a) (9)-1 (a) (2) and 31.3306 (G) (8)-1 (a) require
that the employer-employee relationship must exist for the period for which
any payments are made and that the employee do no work, other than
being subject to call for the performance of work.
Because the IRS apparently did not interpret these provisions as ex-
empting deferred pay arrangements providing for payments after retire-
ment, whether individual or groups, Congress enacted section 3121 (a) (13)
for FICA purposes and section 3306(G) (10) for FUTA purposes. These
sections exclude from the definition of wages subject to FICA any payment
or series of payments made upon or after the termination of an employee's
relationship because of death, retirement, or disability. However, "payments
which would have been paid if the employee's employment relationship had
not so terminated," that is, if the employee had not retired, died, or become
disabled, will not be excluded from FICA and FUTA wages. The benefits
of this exclusion from FICA and FUTA requirements are additionally
limited to group plans which make provision for employees generally or
for a class or classes of employees.
The IRS recently clarified its position on the application of these code
sections in two private letter rulings. In Letter Ruling 7916028,11 a com-
pany had entered into three separate "supplemental compensation arrange-
ments" with its chief executive officer. The first plan called for monthly
installments of $400 to be paid for ten years after retirement no earlier
than age 65. In exchange, the officer agreed not to compete with the com-
pany. The second and third plans provided similar monetary payments in
exchange for an agreement not to compete as well as an agreement to
perform advisory services if necessary.5"
The Internal Revenue Service determined that these payments were
payments on account of retirement and were excepted from "the taxes im-
posed on wages" under sections 3121(a)(3) and 3306(G)(3). However,
53 Letter Ruling 7916028 (1979).
5See Letter Ruling 7916028 (1979) for a more detailed description of the characteristics of
these plans.
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the ruling expressly left open the question of whether or not amounts received
under plans two and three for advisory services would be taxable as em-
ployment income.
In another private ruling, a taxpayer asked if amounts paid under
a deferred compensation plan set up to benefit previous employees who
had terminated employment for reasons other than death, retirement, or
disability could qualify for exclusion from FICA and FUTA requirements.
The Service held that amounts paid under "a deferred bonus plan to em-
ployees whose employment is terminated for any reason other than death,
disability or retirement are 'wages' for purposes of FICA and the FUTA
taxes."55
4.00 Deductions
4.01 Medical Expense - Weight Reduction - Stop Smoking
The IRS in two new rulings disallowed as a medical expense deduction
the cost of a weight reduction program and a program to stop smoking.
In Revenue Ruling 79-151,1 taxpayer participated in a weight reduction
program upon the recommendation of his physician. The taxpayer did not
enter the program to cure any specific ailment or disease, but to improve
his appearance, general health, and sense of well being. In Revenue Ruling
79-162,11 taxpayer, at the suggestion of his physician, participated in a
program to help smokers stop smoking. The taxpayer's purpose in entering
the program was not to cure any specific ailment or disease, but to improve
his general health and sense of well being.
The Service, in denying the deductions, relied upon Treasury Regu-
lation 1.213-1 (e) (1) (ii) which states "Deductions for expenditures for
medical care allowable under section 213 will be confined strictly to ex-
penses incurred primarily for the prevention or alleviation of a physical or
mental defect or illness." The Internal Revenue Service makes a distinction
between treatment that is merely beneficial to the general health of the
individual and treatment for the prevention or alleviation of a physical or
mental defect or illness. Treatment for the prevention or alleviation of a
physical or mental defect or illness is deductible, whereas treatment that
is merely beneficial to the general health of an individual is not deductible.
The Internal Revenue Service in a private letter ruling also disallowed
as a medical expense deduction the cost of a course at a treatment center
that was designed to break taxpayer of his smoking habit.58 None of these
rulings is intended to be a flat prohibition of deduction in all circumstances.
55 Letter Ruling 7848051 (1978).
50 1979-22 I.R.B. 8.
5
1d.
5 8 Letter Ruling 7906009 (1979).
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If a program is prescribed by a physician because of a specific condition,
the cost may still be deductible.
The IRS in previous rulings dealing with alcohol and drug addition appears
to be more lenient in allowing these costs to be taken as medical expense
deductions. The costs of transportation to meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous
Club have been held to be expenses "primarily for and essential to medical
care" and are deductible.5 9 Alcoholism treatment at a therapeutic center 0
and treatment for a dependent who became addicted to narcotic drugs
and entered a therapeutic center are both deductible.' The Regulations
also allow as a medical expense deduction the cost for meals and lodging
while at the therapeutic center.62
4.02 Medical Expense - Capital Improvements
In Haines v. Commissioner,3 the Tax Court upheld a determination
by the Commissioner that the cost of a swimming pool taxpayer had built
in his home was not primarily related to his medical care, and denied the
deduction as a medical expense under section 213.
The petitioner's leg was seriously broken in a skiing accident and for
a limited period of time his leg required therapy. Petitioner found swimming
to be beneficial to his condition and, upon the recommendation of his physi-
cian, had a pool constructed so he could exercise the leg and rebuild its
strength. The pool could only be used from April through October because
of the weather and contained no special equipment to aid the petitioner.
The pool was suitable for general use and petitioner admitted that it was
used by other members of his family and staff.
Under Regulation 1.213-1 (e) (1) (iii) the test for deductibility is wheth-
er the taxpayer's expenditures were incurred for the "primary purpose" of
and were "related directly to" his medical care. In Haines the Tax Court
found that neither one of these requirements was satisfied by the evidence
presented and denied a deduction. "
The Seventh Circuit in Ferris v. Commissioner,65 pointed out that the
costs for any capital improvements, such as a swimming pool are indirect
costs, and "[A]ny costs above those necessary to produce a functionally
adequate facility are not incurred for medical care."" The Tax Court in
Haines appears to agree with the Seventh Circuit, by raising the inference
59 Rev. Rul. 63-273, 1963-2 C.B. 112.
60 Rev. Rul. 73-325, 1973-2 C.B. 75.
61 Rev. Rul. 72-226, 1972-1 C.B. 96.
62 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1 (e) (1) (v) (a).
5 71 T.C. No. 60, 71 Tax Ct. Rep. Dec. (P-H) 71.60 (1979).
64 71 Tax Ct. Rep. Dec. (P-H) at 362.
65 42 A.F.T.R. 2d 5674 (7th Cir. 1978).
661d. See also, Briner, Federal Income Tax Developments: 1978, 12 AKRON L REV. 177,
189 (1978).
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that they may deny or limit the additional costs incurred in a capital ex-
penditure, when the medical treatment can be obtained at a lower cost
from other available sources. The Tax Court noted:
[D]uring the period special therapy for his leg was required, it could
have been secured through other far less costly means; for example, the
petitioner could have secured the necessary therapy at the hospital
or he could have arranged to swim at a health club which was not
far from his residence."7
4.03 Gift and Leaseback Arrangement
The Tax Court8 and the Eighth Circuit69 have recently adopted a
criteria approach in the gift leaseback area. Such is a significant change
from the overall business purpose test employed in the Fifth Circuit."0
Under the criteria approach, the only business purpose required is in con-
nection with the leaseback and not for the gift.
When business property is sold and then simultaneously leased back
to the seller to use in his business, the general rule is tt allow the seller
a rental deduction which qualifies as an ordinary and necessary business
expense under section 162 even if the parties to the transactions are not
strangers.
A dilemma develops where both parties to the transaction have com-
mon interests, such as where professional persons seek to place business
property into a trust for their children. Here, the courts are split on whether
a rental deduction should be allowed. The Tax Court in Mathews v.
Commissioner"' listed the following critical factors for consideration:
1. whether there is a bona fide business purpose for the leaseback,
2. whether the trust is managed and controlled by an independent
trustee,
3. whether the rental amounts are reasonable,
4. whether the grantor retains substantially the same amount of con-
trol over the property donated to the trust after the gift as he did
before, and
5. whether the grantor possesses a disqualifying "equity" in the prop-
erty as referred to in section 162(a)(3)."1
Where all of the above requirements have been met, and the trust is
sufficiently separate and independent from the professional person, the
67 71 Tax Ct. Rep. Dec. (P-H) at 363.
68 Lerner v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. No. 24, 71 Tax Ct. Rep. Dec. (P-H) 71.24 (1978).
69 Quinlivan v. Comm'r, 79-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9396 (8th Cir. 1979).
70 Mathews v. Comm'r, 520 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1975).
7' 61 T.C. 12 (1973); rev'g, 520 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1975).
7261 T.C. at 18.
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professional is permitted to deduct the rental payments."3 In reversing
Mathews, the Fifth Circuit employed an overall business purpose test. Under
this test, a rental deduction is allowed only if the rental payment arose solely
out of business necessity for any purpose. Where the sole purpose for
the payment is to divide the taxpayer's income tax, the rental deduction
will be disallowed.'"
Recently, in Lerner v. Commissioner,"' a different approach to the
rental deduction dilemma proved successful. In this case, Dr. Lerner set
up his practice as a professional corporation in which he was the sole
shareholder. He also established a Clifford trust, pursuant to sections 671-
678, for the benefit of his children. Dr. Lerner transferred the business
property to the trust, rather than to the corporation. The corporation, in
turn, then leased the business property from the trust. By involving this
third independent taxing entity, the professional corporation, Dr. Lerner
eliminated the problem of establishing the trust's independence from him-
self because here the corporation, and not Dr. Lerner personally, was the
lessee. The rental payments were considered ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expenses of the professional corporation and taxable as ordinary in-
come to the beneficiaries of the trust. Since the reversionary interest lay
with Dr. Lerner and not with the lessee corporation, the Tax Court held
that the rental deduction was not barred under section 162(a) (3). Apply-
ing the criteria approach as set forth by the Tax Court in Mathews, the
Court found that all of the requirements were met and allowed the rental
deduction to the corporation.
The Eighth Circuit in Quinlivan v. United States,"6 joined the Tax
Court in rejecting the overall business purpose test and in applying the
criteria approach to the use of gift-leasebacks with short-term Clifford Trusts.
In Quinlivan, two attorneys owned, as tenants in common, the building
which housed their law firm. Both law partners transferred their one-half
interest in the building to a bank which acted as trustee for separate trusts
that the attorneys had established for their children. The trustee was in-
dependent from the attorneys and their spouses, and rental income from
the building was properly taxed to the beneficiaries in accordance with
sections 671-678. By a written lease, the attorneys' law firm rented the
premises for an initial three-year term followed by one-year renewals at
reasonable rental fees. When the law firm deducted the rental payments
made to the trustee, the Internal Revenue Service disallowed the deductions
contending that the rentals paid were not ordinary and necessary business
expenses under section 162(a) because "the obligation to pay such rentals
Is E.g., Skemp v. Comm'r, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948).
", E.g., Van Zandt v. Comn'r, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1965).
75 71 Tax Ct. Rep. Dec. (P-H) at 164.
76 79-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) at 86971.
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arose out of a transaction serving no business purpose and having tax
avoidance as its sole objective. '7 7
In rejecting the business purpose test, the Eighth Circuit made the
following three observations:
1. Congress has specified that the business purpose test is concerned
with the "continued use or possession" of the property. There is
no justification for adding an inquiry into the origin of the lessor's
title in applying this requirement.18
2. By following the Internal Revenue Service's approach of permitting
the sale-leaseback provisions of sections 671-678 to apply only
where investment property-property not used in the grantor's
trade or business-is involved, would exclude a large number of
"persons whose assets consist largely of business property" from
obtaining "a tax benefit clearly provided by Congress.""9
3. The majority view of the courts on this issue is in line with the
approach taken by the Tax Court.80
Thus, while the courts are split on the issue of allowing rental deduc-
tions for sale-leaseback arrangements involving Clifford trusts, the majority
view seems to be that of the Tax Court. While the Internal Revenue Service,
the Fourth Circuit,81 and the Fifth Circuit all advocate the business pur-
pose test, the Tax Court, along with the Third,83 Seventh," Eighth, 8 and
Ninth Circuits8 seem to favor the criterial approach.
4.04 Travel and Entertainment Expenses
The Tax Court's decision in the recent case of Burke v. Commissioner7
emphasizes the crucial need to make timely diary entries at or near the
time of the expenditure to substantiate away-from-home travel and enter-
tainment expenses.
Raymond C. Burke was employed as a flight engineer for Braniff
Airlines which position required him to make several business trips outside
the Dallas area in 1973. Braniff reimbursed Mr. Burke for a portion of
his expenditures incurred while on these business trips. Mr. Burke also
served as a Reserve officer in the United States Navy. His active and re-
serve duty required travel away from home in 1973, and the Navy re-
77Id. at 86971.
7 8
1d.
7
91d. at 86973.
0 Id.
81 Perry v. United States, 520 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1975).
82 520 F.2d at 323.
83 Brown v. Comm'r, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir. 1950).
84 168 F.2d at 598.
85 79-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) at 86971.
86 Brooke v. United States, 468 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1972).
8748 T.C.M. (P-H) 79,195 (1979).
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imbursed him for his active duty travel expenses. But the Navy did not
give Mr. Burke any reimbursement for his reserve duty. Mr. Burke kept
a daily diary in 1973 of his travel expenses. Following section 162(a)(2)
Mr. Burke sought deductions on his income tax return for the excess
amount of travel expenses he incurred while on Navy and Braniff business
trips for which he was never reimbursed.
While the taxpayer's travel expenses were found to be reasonable in
amount and ordinary and necessary business expenses as required by Regu-
lation 1.162-2(a), the taxpayer's diary failed to meet adequate records
requirement of section 274(d) and Regulation 1.274-5(b) (2).
Regulation 1.274-5 (b) (2) requires that expenditures be substantiated by
records of the following elements:
1. the amount expended,
2. the time of travel,
3. the place of travel, and
4. the business purpose.
In addition, Regulation 1.274-5(c) (2) requires that the entries in
the account book or diary kept by the taxpayer be recorded at or near the
time of the expenditure.
In Mr. Burke's case, it was found that although his diary contained
all four of the initially required elements for substantiation, his records
were inadequate because "in certain instances, the place and business pur-
pose of petitioner's travel were recorded in later years."88 Mr. Burke did
succeed in deducting some of his expenses by using alternate methods of
substantiation (such as corroboration by business flight logs, Navy active
duty orders, and canceled checks and receipts).8 However, this amounted
to only approximately half the deduction he originally sought.
Thus, the need to keep accurate, complete and timely records of
business expenses incurred while away from home is essential for com-
pliance with the Internal Revenue Service's adequate records requirement
for substantiation of deductions.
4.05 Unreasonable Compensation
Section 162(a)(1) allows a taxpayer to deduct as an ordinary and
necessary business expense "a reasonable allowance for salaries." For a
closely held corporation, this area is one that is the frequent cause of litiga-
tion."° In Eduardo Catalano, Inc. v. Commissioner,"' the Commissioner de-
termined that the compensation paid to the sole stockholder and only em-
88 48 T.C.M. (P-H) at 79,195.
9 Id. See also, Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5(c) (2) (iii).
90 See Briner, Federal Income Tax Developments: 1975, 9 AKRON L. REv. 411, 441 (1976);
Briner, Federal Income Tax Developments: 1974, 8 AKRON L. REv. 206, 237 (1975).
9148 T.C.M. (P-H) 79-183 (1979).
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ployee was unreasonable. In 1973, the corporation paid the stockholder-em-
ployee a total compensation of over $225,000 and had net income before
taxes of only $525 on gross receipts of over $700,000. The Tax Court, in
holding that the compensation paid was reasonable, considered the stock-
holder-employee's expertise, his being the only source of income, the method
of computing compensation, and the corporation's financial status after
payments. The Court noted that it was disturbed by the corporation's
failure to pay any dividend and stated that a point in time would come
when dividends would have to begin.
The Tax Court in Rich Plan of New England, Inc. v. Commissioner,"
listed several objective factors in determining the reasonable compensation
of a stockholder-executive of a closely held corporation. In the stockholder-
executive's favor were: (1) his qualifications and competence as an execu-
tive; (2) his efforts and experience; (3) his instrumental part in the de-
velopment and growth of the corporation; and (4) his salary as a percentage
of sales had remained fairly constant and had even decreased when com-
pared to income before taxes and salaries. Factors against the stockholder-
executive were: (1) he set his own salary; (2) salary was set in October when
annual profits could be measured; (3) no independent evidence to support
the value of his services; and (4) the corporation's failure to pay any
dividends.
In 1970 the Court of Claims93 held that part of the compensation paid
to a stockholder-executive by his closely held corporation would be con-
sidered a dividend because the corporation had distributed little or no
dividends to the stockholder. Under this ruling, many closely held corpo-
rations faced the possible disallowance of some part of the compensation
paid to stockholder-executives merely because of a poor dividend history.
In Revenue Ruling 79-8°" the Internal Revenue Service stated its position
that the dividend history of a corporation is a "very significant factor" in
determining the reasonableness of compensation, but the compensation would
not automatically be declared a dividend solely upon a poor dividend history.
"[W]here . . . compensation . . . is found to be reasonable . . .deduc-
tions for such compensation under section 162(a) will not be denied on
the sole ground that the corporation has not paid more than an insubstantial
portion of its earnings as dividends on its outstanding stock."95
Even a substantial minority interest in a closely held corporation by
a listed corporation will not shield a bonus compensation arrangement from
the scrutiny of the Internal Revenue Service. In Kewaunee Engineering
-47 T.C.M. (P-H) t 178,514 (1978).
03 Charles McCandless Tile Service v. United States, 422 F.2d 1336 (Ct. C1. 1970).
" 1979-2 I.R.B. 6.
95 Id.
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Corp. v. Commissioner,9" a closely held corporation had set up for its two
top stockholder-executives a bonus compensation arrangement. Shortly there-
after, International Harvester Company bought a thirty-five percent interest
in the corporation and agreed to the bonus. The Tax Court disallowed
part of the bonus compensation because there was no free bargain as re-
quired in the regulations. 7 There was no arm's-length agreement because
at the time the bonus was set, the two stockholder-executives were in com-
plete control of the corporation.
4.06 Fashion Clothing
In Pevsner v. Commissioner,98 the Tax Court recently held that where
the individual's job requires clothing that is unsuitable for private wear
because it is inconsistent with the individual's life-style, the cost of the
clothing will be deductible to the taxpayer. Such decision is a rejection of
the Service's "objective test" in applying Revenue Ruling 70-474,11 which
states that "work-related clothing can't be deducted if it is of a type adapt-
able to general or continued usage . . . ." IRS previously contended that
it is necessary to look at the clothing itself, and if it can be worn off the
job, a deduction will be denied.
The taxpayer in Pevsner was a boutique manager. Her job required
that she wear Yves St. Laurent fashions on the job as well as at job-related
social functions. All the clothing was acquired at her own expense. Tax-
payer contended that this exclusive wardrobe was a deductible employee
expense. The Tax Court agreed. The court pointed out that Yves St. Laur-
ent fashions may be worn by some persons for general purposes ,but "[I]t
certainly is not the type of apparel worn by most women generally."
Although this case seems to represent an exception to prior decisions,
the Tax Court in 1958 reached a similar result. In Yeomans v. Com-
missioner,' the Tax Court found that the taxpayer, who was employed as
fashion coordinator of General Shoe Corporation and was required to attend
various meetings of style and fashion experts in the shoe manufacturing
field, could deduct the cost of her fashion clothing required to be worn
at such meetings and stagings of style shows. The clothing which was
used in the course of her employment and in earning her salary was not
suitable for personal and private wear and was not so worn by her. There-
fore, the cost of such clothing was a proper deduction in computing net
income for the taxable years in question. Although the Pevsner decision kind-
les the argument that work-related clothing can be deducted if it is not
the type of apparel worn by most people generally, the cases arising after
9648 T.C.M. (P-H) 79,154 (1979).
9 t Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(2).
9848 T.C.M. (P-H) 79,311 (1979).
99 1970-2 C.B. 35.
100 30 T.C. 757 (1958).
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Yeomans indicate that this type of decision will be strictly construed and
simply applied to fashion clothing. It appears that the argument that a
businessman's suit which cannot be worn in comformity with his personal
life-style and which may involve sports or outdoor activities will not be
an allowable business deduction.
4.07 Traveling Expense
The Tax Court, in Walliser v. Commissioner' disallowed a deduction
for the cost that taxpayer incurred in going on tour groups where he sought
contacts with present and potential customers. The court held that the
taxpayer's travel expenses constituted an ordinary and necessary business
expense. But since the taxpayer failed to show that the travel expenses
were directly related to the active conduct of his business, they were dis-
allowed.
As a bank officer, taxpayer was primarily responsible for the market-
ing of permanent and interim loans. Loan production quotas were assigned
and he expected annual raises if he met them. To help meet these quotas,
taxpayer and his wife traveled with tours that were sponsored by corpo-
rations and attended by area builders and developers and their spouses.
The taxpayer conversed with other people on the tour about the availability
of loans, but no formal meetings were held and no specific business trans-
actions were negotiated.
The court first determined that the requisite proximate relation had
been shown to constitute the travel expenses as ordinary and necessary
business expenses as required in section 162(a) (2). The court then con-
sidered the Service's position that the taxpayer had failed to show that the
trips were "directly related" to the active conduct of his business as re-
quired in section 274(a).
Under the objective test set forth in Regulation 1.274-2(b) (1) (ii), it is
irrelevant how the taxpayer regarded the tours. These types of tours are
generally considered vacation trips, and thus under the "objective test"
should be classified as entertainment. The "directly related" test requires
that the taxpayer show "more than a general expectation of deriving some
income or business benefit from the expenditure, other than the goodwill
of the person or persons entertained."'' ° The latter test was not satisfied.
The intent of Congress in enacting section 274(a) was to disallow expenditures
which involve merely the promotion of goodwill in a social setting.
5.00 Tax Credits
5.01 Investment Tax Credit - Rehabilitation Expenditures
The Technical Amendments Act of 1979103 coordinates the invest-
10172 T.C. No. 40, 72 Tax Ct. Rep. Dec. (P-H) 72.40 (1979).
102 72 Tax Ct. Rep. Dec. (P-H) at 241.
10 3Technical Corrections Act of 1979 § 103 (a) (3) (A), to be codified in I.R.C. § 46(e) (3)
(1979).
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ment tax credit (ITC) with provisions for rehabilitation of older structures.
Under prior law, section 46 required noncorporate lessors of com-
mercial real property to follow the limitations of either producing the
property themselves or leasing the property for less than half its useful life,
taking into account renewal options. For the first twelve months, the
section 162 deductions cannot exceed fifteen percent of the rental income to
obtain ITC benefits. These limitations were intended to deal with equipment
leasing, but the wording of section 46(e) makes it applicable to all "prop-
erty" of noncorporate lessors. In order to qualify as section 38 property and
be eligible for the investment tax credit, the limitations under section 46(e)
were to be met. However, in the usual course of commercial real property
leasing, the tenant is obligated to pay the taxes, maintenance and insurance.
The net lease is also customary,' thus placing the noncorporate lessors
at a disadvantage.
This Act makes the noncorporate lessor provisions inapplicable in
order to qualify rehabilitation expenditures for the investment tax credit.
Now, noncorporate lessors can bypass section 46 and go directly to
sections 48(a) and (g) 05 to qualify for the investment tax credit. The
effect of this is to bring back a tax shelter that Congress had sought to
remedy. Investors may now deal with commercial leased real property by
taking depreciation and a hefty credit against their own taxes as had been
done before with equipment leasing.
6.00 Depreciation
7.00 Gains and Losses
7.01 Capital Gains - Sale and Leaseback
In a recent announcement," ° the Internal Revenue Service acknowl-
edged its continued reliance on Century Electric Co. v. Commissioner
°T in
the area of sale and leaseback of property. They also reaffirmed their refusal
to acquiesce in Leslie Co. v. Commissioner."°8
Since 1959, the Service and certain courts have been engaged in a
controversy concerning the sale and leaseback of property. Both adhere
to their opposite viewpoints even today. The controversy involves the ap-
plicability of section 1031 to a sale of property and leaseback for a term
of thirty years or more. The IRS' position is that if the leaseback is for
thirty years or more, the sale and leaseback qualifies as a tax-free exchange
aO4 HousB, CoMM. ON WAYS AND MENS, H.R. Doc. No. 2797, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. Re-
port 96-250 (June 7, 1979).
'm Section 48(a)(1)(E) includes qualified rehabilitated buildings in the definition of § 38
property. Section 48(g) then sets forth the requirements of qualification.
208 Nonacq., 1978-2 C.B. 3.
107 192 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1951).
108 539 F.2d 943 (3rd Cir, 1976).
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of like-kind properties under section 1031 and therefore any loss on the ex-
change is not recognized. 109
An example of such an exchange is illustrated in the regulations, where
a taxpayer, who is not a dealer in real estate, exchanges a leasehold of real
property with thirty years or more. The exchange qualifies for the non-
recognition provisions of section 1031 and no loss or gain will be allowed.
The reasoning is that a leashold of thirty years or more is equivalent to a
fee interest.110
In an early Eighth Circuit case,"' the court stated that since the
regulation was in force for many years, and survived reenactments of the
Internal Revenue Acts, it had acquired the force of law. In Century Electric,
the taxpayer sold a foundry to a college and then leased back the foundry
from the college for ninety-five years. The adjusted basis of the property
sold was $531,000 and the market value was $250,000. The taxpayer con-
veyed the property to the college and received $150,000 cash and the lease-
hold interest for a term of ninety-five years. The Eighth Circuit held that
the transaction was a non-taxable exchange, and as such the $381,000
loss on the exchange was not allowed. The court stated that the difference
between the cash and adjusted basis was the cost of the leasehold interest.
Taxpayer was entitled to depreciate the leasehold ($381,000) over the
term of the lease.112
The Second Circuit,1 in reversing the Tax Court, reached an opposite
conclusion. This decision marked the beginning of the present controversy
between the courts and the Internal Revenue Service. In Jordan Marsh the
taxpayer conveyed the fee of two parcels of property, which were used
for its department store, to a stranger. In return, the taxpayer received $2.3
million which was equivalent to the fair market value of the properties.
Leases of the same properties for terms of thirty years and three days
with options to renew were received by the taxpayer. The rent to be paid
under the leases was full and normal so that the leasehold interests were
of no capital value. The court held that the transaction must be classified
as a sale and allowed the taxpayer to deduct the loss as ordinary. " The
court distinguished Century Electric from its decision in Jordan Marsh by
stating that the cash received by the taxpayer in Century Electric was not the
full equivalent of the value of the property conveyed. Also, the leaseback did
not call for a rent which was fully equal to the fair rental value of the
premises, whereas the leasehold interest in Century Electric had a premium
'
09 Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-l(c).
110 1 d.
M1x Century Electric Co. v. Comm'r, 192 F.2d at 160.11 2 ld. at 160.
I's Jordan Marsh Co. v. Comm'r, 269 F.2d 453 (2nd Cir. 1959).
11 4 Id. at 458.
[Vol. 13:2
26
Akron Law Review, Vol. 13 [1980], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol13/iss2/1
FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS: 1979
value. The court also distinguished Jordan Marsh because there the tax-
payer-lessee paid all taxes on the properties."'
The main distinction between Century Electric and Jordan Marsh
centers around the Congressional intent in enacting the provisions for non-
taxable exchanges (section 1031 and its predecessors). The court in Jordan
Marsh stated, "Congress was primarily concerned with the inequity, in the
case of an exchange, of forcing a taxpayer to recognize a paper gain which
was still tied up in a continuing investment."' " When the taxpayer has not
really "cashed in" on the theoretical gain or closed out a losing venture, no
gain or loss should be recognized. However, the court in Century Electric
reasoned that the nonrecognition provisions were based on the difficulty
of making the valuations necessary to compute gains and losses."'
Immediately following the Jordan Marsh decision, the Service published
Revenue Ruling 60-43,'"8 which stated that the IRS will not follow the
decision in Jordan Marsh. The IRS emphasized its position by stating that
a sale and leaseback under the Jordan Marsh circumstances constitutes a
single integrated transaction under which there is an exchange of property
of like kind with cash as boot.119
The controversy was rekindled in 1975 in Leslie Co. v. Commissioner,"9
where the taxpayer constructed a new manufacturing plant for its own use.
The cost (adjusted basis) was $3.2 million, while the fair market value of
the plant was $2.4 million. The taxpayer entered into an agreement with
the Prudential Insurance Company to sell them the plant for $2.4 million
and Prudential leased back the property to taxpayer for a term of thirty
years. The taxpayer reported a loss of $800,000 from the transaction. The
Commissioner, adhering to the IRS' position on sales and leasebacks,
claimed there was no loss recognized because there was a section 1031
exchange of like-kind property. However, the Tax Court held that the
transaction concerning the plant constituted a sale, not an exchange, and
allowed the taxpayer to deduct an ordinary loss." The Tax Court cited
Regulation 1.1002-1(b) which defined an exchange as "[a] transaction in-
volving the reciprocal transfer of property" (as distinguished from a transfer
of property for money consideration).'"
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the Tax Court ruling and agreed
115 Id. at 457.
Ie Id. at 456.
'IT 192 F.2d at 159.
I'S 1960-1 C.B. 687.
119 Id. at 687; See also City Investing Co. v. Comm'r, 38 T.C. 1 (1962).
120 64 T.C. 247 (1975).
"2' Id. at 254.
'2 Id. at 252.
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with its reasoning. 1' The Third Circuit examined the conflict between
Jordan Marsh and Century Electric in detail, interpreting the essential dif-
ference between the two cases as their respective views of the need to value
the properties involved in a sale and leaseback.' In Jordan Marsh, the pur-
pose in creating the nonrecognition provisions was the avoidance of taxing
paper gains and losses. Thus, that court would value the properties in-
volved to determine whether the requirements of an exchange have been
met. In Century Electric, the court found the purpose of the nonrecognition
provisions was to relieve the administrative burden of valuation of the
properties involved. Therefore, the Century Electric view regards the value
of the properties as irrelevant.
The Third Circuit in Leslie, determined the Jordan Marsh approach
the "more satisfactory" one.'25 In support, it considered the Jordan Marsh
"exchange" definition created by the Treasury and its interpretation of Con-
gress' purpose in making the nonrecognition provisions.
Neither the Tax Court nor the Leslie decision influenced the IRS' posi-
tion on sale and leasebacks. The Service recently stated that the Commission-
er does not acquiesce in the Leslie decision of the Tax Court. " The Service
still relies on the Century Electric case and Regulation 1.1031(a)-i(c) as
the proper authority on sale and leaseback cases, where the leaseback is for
thirty years or more. Thus, the battle, now in its twentieth year, continues
with neither the courts nor the Service discarding its initial viewpoint.
7.02 Capital Gains - Patents
The Internal Revenue Service reversed its earlier position regarding
capital gain treatment in the transfer of patents by an individual to his
wholly owned corporation." 7 The Service now agrees with the Tax Court and
the Circuits that the sale by the holder of a patent to a related corporation
is not subject to the unstated interest rule of section 483 since section
483(f)(4) does apply to such transfers. However, consistent with prior
rulings, one who is not a holder under section 1235 (b), does not qualify for
the section 483 (f) (4) exception.
Section 483 provides that where property is sold for capital gain under
a deferred payment arrangement in which no interest or an inadequate rate
of interest is provided, the Code will generally impute interest at seven
percent compounded semi-annually, thus, converting part of the sales price
into interest income. However, section 483(f) (4) states that interest will
not be imputed to any deferred payments made pursuant to a transfer "de-
scribed in section 1235 (a) have been the subject of controversy.
123 539 F.2d at 943.
24 Id. at 948.
'2
5 Id. at 949.
120 1978-2 C.B. at 3.
17 Rev, Rul. 78-124, 1978-1 C.B. 147 rev'g, Rev. Rul. 72-138, 1972-1 C.B. 140.
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Capital gain treatment will be given to a transfer by a holder under
section 1235 (b), of property consisting of all substantial rights to a patent
or an unrecorded interest therein which includes a part of all such rights.
Section 1235(b) defines a holder as "any individual whose efforts created
such property or (2) any other individual who has acquired his interest in
such property in exchange for consideration in money or money's worth
paid to the creator prior to the invention covered by the patent being put
into practice." If the individual is the employer of the creator or "related"
to the creator, he is not a holder. Thus, if the transfer of the substantial
rights to a patent is made by an individual who does not qualify as a "holder"
under section 1235(b), the transfer will not receive capital gain treatment.
Section 1235(d) provides that section 1235(a) will not apply to a
transfer between related persons as determined under section 267(b) as
modified by section 1235(d)(1). If the transfer of all substantial rights
to a patent is made by a holder to a person who is related, under section
267(b), to the holder, the transfer will not receive capital gain treatment
under section 1235 (a).
The controversy of section 483(f) (4) stems from the language, "a
transfer described in section 1235(a)."
The two-pronged dispute is: (1) whether a holder who transfers patent
rights to a 1235(d) related person may qualify for the section 483(f)-(4)
exception; and (2) whether a patent owner who is not a holder under
section 1235(b) may qualify for the section 483(f)(4) exception.
The Internal Revenue Service Ruling 78-124128 examined two patent
transfer situations in an attempt to resolve these issues.
Situation 1: An individual transfers all substantial rights in certain
patents to a corporation. The corporation is wholly owned by the individual.
Payment of the purchase price is deferred over the life of the patent with
no provisions made for interest. The individual is a holder under section
1235(b), but the individual and corporation are related persons within
the meaning of section 1235(d). The transfer in situation one meets all
the requirements of section 1235(a). It is a transfer of property consisting
of all substantial rights to a patent by a holder. Therefore, it is a transfer
described in section 1235(a), even though because of section 1235(d),
the transfer is not governed by section 1235 (a) for the purpose of determin-
ing whether the transfer is the sale of a capital asset. The Service held in
Revenue Ruling 78-124 that the section 483(f)(4) exception applies to
the transfer adopting a literal interpretation of the language of section 483
(f) (4).
This conclusion is a complete reversal of the Service's prior position
128 Id.
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in Revenue Ruling 72-138."9 Several court decisions support the latter
ruling. 30
In situation two,1 ' the Service looked at the issue of whether a patent
owner who is not a holder under section 1235(b) may qualify for the
section 483 (f) (4) exception to imputed interest.
Situation 2: A corporation transfers all substantial rights to certain pat-
ents to another unrelated corporation for a stated dollar amount. Payment
of the purchase price is periodically made over the term of the transferee's
use of the patent. No provision is made for the payment of interest. The
transferor corporation is not a holder under section 1235(b). The Service's
position in Revenue Ruling 78-124 concerning the second situation is con-
sistent with its earlier viewpoint in Revenue Ruling 72-138. The Service
concluded that the transfer is not a transfer described in section 1235 (a)
because the transferor is not a holder. Since the transferor is not a holder, all
the requirements of section 1235 (a) are not met. Since the transfer was
not described in section 1235(a), the section 483(f) (4) exception is not
applicable to the transfer. Interest is required to be reported according to the
provisions of section 483. The Tax Court and the Court of Claims support
the IRS' viewpoint in situation two."
The distinction between situation 1 and situation 2 and the applicability
of section 483 (f) (4) is fairly clear. In situation 1, the transfer was made
by a holder and all the requirements of section 1235 (a) were met. The re-
quirements of section 1235(a) were not all met in situation 2, since trans-
feror was not a holder. Thus, the transfer in Situation 1 is literally described
in section 1235 (a) while the transfer in situation 2 is not. In order for a
transfer to be described in section 1235 (a) the transfer must meet all the
requirements of section 1235. Those requirements are: the transfer must
be other than by gift, inheritance or devise; there must be a transfer of
property consisting of all substantial rights to a patent or an undivided
interest therein which includes a part of all such rights; and, finally, that
transfer must be made by a holder as defined in section 1235(b) applying
a literal interpretation of section 483(f)(4) a transfer meeting all of the
above requirements is a transfer described in section 1235(a). If one of
the requirements is missing (such as the transferor is not a holder under
section 1235(b), the transfer is not described in section 1235(a). Such a
transfer would not be entitled to the section 483(f)(4) unstated interest
exception.
129 1972-1 C.B. 140.
13o See Busse v. Comm'r, 479 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1973); Paxton v. United States, 53 T.C.
202 (1971); and Goldman v. United States, 34 A.F.T.R. 2d 6019 (D.C. La. 1974).
IL1 1978-1 C.B. at 147.
L3' See Ransburg Corp. and Subsidiaries v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 271 (1979); and, Busse v. United
States, 543 F.2d 132. (Ct. Cl. 1976).
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7.03 Nontaxable Charges - Like-kind Property
Two recent revenue rulings" have defined a "like-kind" exchange in
regards to gold coins. Although superficially inconsistent, the application
of section 1030(a) is entirely consistent between the rulings and applicable
court decisions. Bullion-type gold coins are one type, while numismatic
(collector) coins are different. An exchange of these is not a like-kind ex-
change.
Certain exchanges do not produce a legally taxable exchange under
section 1031 (a). No gain or loss is recognized if property held for pro-
ductive use in trade or business or for investment is exchanged solely for
property of a like kind to be held either for productive use in a trade or
business or for investment.
In Revenue Ruling 76-214,13' an exchange of Mexican fifty-peso gold
coins for Austrian one-hundred-corona gold coins was held to qualify under
section 1031 (a) for nonrecognition of gain. The subject coins were bullion-
type coins whose current value is determined on the basis of their gold con-
tent. Neither is now currency in its respective country. Thus, the Internal
Revenue Service noted that the nature or character of the gold coins is the
same and as such they are like-kind property under section 1031 (a). Al-
though the coins differed in size, shape, and amount, such distinctions do
not relate to the nature or character of the coins. Since both coins were of
bullion type, they were like-kind investment property and therefore quali-
fied for nonrecognition of gain from the exchange under section 1031 (a).
In a recent Revenue Ruling, 3 ' the Internal Revenue Service sought
to further clarify the "like-kind" interpretation under section 1031 (a) con-
cerning gold coins. A different result as to recognition of gain was reached
in Revenue Ruling 79-143, but the application of Section 1031 (a) was still
consistent with Revenue Ruling 76-214111 The owner of United States twenty-
dollar gold coins exchanged them for South African Krugerrand gold coins.
A gain was realized as a result of the exchange by the taxpayer-owner.
However, this exchange was not of bullion-type coins for bullion-type coins.
The United States twenty-dollar gold coins are numismatic or "collector" gold
coins. The value of numismatic-type coins is determined by their age, num-
ber minted, history, art and aesthetics, condition, and metal content. The
South African gold coins are bullion-type coins whose value is determined
solely on the basis of their metal content. Therefore, the very nature or
character of the two types of gold coins differs.
In an early, but still viable interpretation of like-kind exchanges, the
133 Rev. Rul. 76-214, 1976-1 C.B. 218; and Rev. Rul. 79-143, 1979-19 I.R.B. 19.
134 1976-1 C.B. 218.
135 19 I.R.B. at 19.
336 1976-1 C.B. 218.
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Fifth Circuit in Crichton13' held that the like-kind distinction made by the
statute is broad as between classes and characters of properties, for in-
stance, real and personal property. In Revenue Ruling 79-143,"8' although
the gold coins appeared to be similar because they both contained gold, they
actually represented totally different types of underlying investments. The
Internal Revenue Service stated that bullion-type coins represent an in-
vestment in gold on the world markets, while numismatic-type coins repre-
sent an investment in the coins themselves.
It should be noted that, under section 1031(a), the gain on the ex-
change of "like-kind" property is not immediately recognized. The basis
of the property acquired is the same as the basis of the property transferred.
The recognition of gain (or loss) is postponed. However, upon a sale or
other taxable event concerning the property, a taxable gain will be recog-
nized. Thus, the nontaxable exchange under section 1031 implies a tax
postponement, not a tax exemption.
7.04 Nonrecognition - Three-Cornered Exchanges
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Starker v. United States, 9 provides a lib-
eral variation to three-cornered exchanges by permitting section 1031's non-
recognition of gain treatment to apply where the like-kind property is not
exchanged simultaneously. Starker allows the buyer to credit the seller for
the sales price and then to reduce this credit as the seller selects like-kind
property which the buyer buys and transfers back to the seller. Any excess
credit balance remaining can then be returned in cash to the seller, tax-free.
And, even though the whole transaction may extend over several years, it
still qualifies for nonrecognition treatment under section 1031.
When property is disposed of, the general rule, under section 1001
is that the entire gain or loss from the transaction is recognized. Section
1031 provides an exception to this general rule by deferring recognition of
the gain or loss when a taxpayer makes a direct exchange of property with
a second party. Section 1031 attempts to allow nonrecognition in trans-
actions in which the nature of the investment is not changed." ° If "boot" is
also received, gain will be recognized to the extent that the gain does not
exceed the fair market value of the "boot" received.
Thus, section 1031 provides for nonrecognition of gain in three-
cornered transactions where party A, rather than selling land for cash to
B, transfers the land to B in exchange for B's purchase and transfer of
parcel C to A. Even though the exchange does not take place until all
properties are acquired, it receives nonrecognition treatment according to
'
3 7 Comm'r v. Crichton, 122 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1941).
138 1979-19 I.R.B. at 19.
'L344 A.F.T.R. 2d 5524 (1979).
140 E.g., Portland Oil Co. v. Comm'r, 109 F.2d 479 (1st Cir. 1940).
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Alderson v. Commissioner.14 1 And, as first established under Mercantile Trust
Co. of Baltimore v. Commissioner," 2 the possibility of A receiving cash if
the C parcel cannot be obtained does not defeat the transaction's nonrecog-
nition treatment. Several circuits1 4 3 have followed Mercantile Trust in hold-
ing that the mere possibility at the time of agreement that a cash sale might
occur does not prevent the application of section 1031. Also, under J. H. Baird
Publishing Co., 4 it is clear that A still obtains like-kind exchange treatment
even if B does not own the property to be traded at the time the exchange
contract is entered into.
The recent Ninth Circuit case of Starker v. United States" allows for
even greater flexibility in sales transactions while retaining the benefit of
nonrecognition of gains. The old method of the three-cornered transactions
required delaying closing both deals until the new property could be located
and the second closing could be arranged; then, a three-way closing was at-
tempted. In practice, however, it was difficult to work out a three-way swap
within the limited time restraints imposed by the closing and the escrow
officers. Under the Starker case, this situation was alleviated.
In 1967, T. J. Starker, his son, and daughter-in-law entered into a
Land Exchange Agreement with Crown Zellerbach Corporation in which
the Starkers transferred Oregon timberland to Crown, and Crown entered
an exchange balance on its books in the amount of $1.5 million for T. J.
Starker and $73,500 for the Starker son and daughter-in-law. The agreement
provided that the Starkers would locate acceptable parcels of real property
which Crown would then purchase and convey to them, and thereupon re-
duce the exchange balance by the purchase price and the acquisition costs.
The Starkers also received an additional credit of interest at six percent per
year based on the exchange balance remaining on Crown's books at the
end of each month. From 1967-1969, twelve parcels located by the Starkers
were acquired by Crown and transferred to the Starkers. In 1967, three
of these parcels were transferred to the son and daughter-in-law cancelling
out their exchange balance, and they received no cash. Of the remaining nine
parcels, two were never conveyed directly to T. J. Starker. Instead, they
were transferred by Crown to Jean Roth, Starker's daughter. As to a third
parcel, Crown never had title to the property itself. What Crown transferred
to Starker was the purchase price plus an assignment of Crown's right to
the property so that Starker could purchase it himself. The Starkers treated
all the transactions as nonrecognition transactions under section 1031.
'4' 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963).
1432 B.T.A. 82 (1935).
'~ Alderson v. Comm'r, 317 F.2d at 790 (9th Cir. 1963); Mercantile Trust Co. of Balti-
more v. Comm'r, 320 F.2d 333 (4th Cir. 1963); and Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d (5th
Cir. 1967).
1- 39 T.C. 608 (1962).
145 44 A.F.T.R. 2d at 5524.
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The Internal Revenue Service disagreed, however, and assessed a tax de,-
ficiency against both T. J. Starker and the son and daughter-in-law. The
younger Starkers filed an action for a tax refund and won. The court, rely-
ing on Alderson,1 held that the transfers were entitled to section 1031's
nonrecognition treatment (Starker I).7 The government's appeal was volun-
tarily dismissed, and the Starkers received their refund.
Then, in Starker H,18 the same judge refused to apply collateral es-
toppel and reversed his prior holding in Starker I. The court narrowly in-
terpreted the term "exchange" in section 1031 to apply only to reciprocal
transfers and not for promises to convey like-kind property in the future.
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the two parcels that were transferred
to Starker's daughter, rather than to T. J. Starker himself, were not given
the benefit of nonrecognition treatment since no properties were "exchanged."
To qualify as an exchange, T. J. Starker himself instead of a third party
-here, his daughter-must have received the property ownership. But
the court granted nonrecognition treatment to a third parcel transfer which
did not pass legal title to T. J. Starker. The court held that T. J. Starker
received the equivalent of a fee interest for purposes of section 1031,
and that the transfers of property, to be effective, need not be made simul-
taneously. Also, the court held that the six percent growth factor actually
represented interest to Starker. Thus, this amount was taxed to Starker as
ordinary income.
The Ninth Circuit's Starker decision allows nonrecognition of gain
treatment to apply to like-kind transfers which extend over several years.
It also allows buyers to establish credit accounts for the sellers until the
seller can locate appropriate like-kind property.
The Starker situation may, however, be difficult to use with all buyers.
Some sellers may not want to risk leaving large, unpaid sums with certain
buyers. But in an Internal Revenue Service Private Letter Ruling 49 an
alternative exists. This ruling allows the sales price to be put in trust with
an independent trustee. A, according to an exchange agreement, simply
transfers the property to a trust. The trust then transfers the property to
B in exchange for the selling price. The trust holds the cash until A
designates exchange property, C. Then the trust uses the cash to purchase
the C property and transfers it to A. A can, at any time, elect to treat the
transaction as a sale and get the cash. Also, any income earned on the trust
corpus belongs to the trust and thus to A.
These recent decisions now permit the application of section 1031's
nonrecognition treatment to reach a wider range of transfers.
146317 F.2d at 790.
147 Starker v. United States, 35 A.F.T.R. 2d 1550 (1975).
148 432 F. Supp. 864 (D. Or. 1977).
149 Letter Ruling 7938087.
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8.00 Procedure
8.01 Electronic Surveillance
In United States v. Caceres5 ° the Supreme Court held that evidence
obtained by the Internal Revenue Service by use of electronic surveillance
equipment in violation of an IRS regulation 5' did not have to be excluded
from evidence in the criminal trial of a taxpayer for bribing an Internal
Revenue Service agent. The court ruled that a court has no duty to enforce
agency regulations unless compliance is required by the Constitution or by
statute.
Taxpayer Caceres began meeting with IRS agent Yee on March 14,
1974 concerning an audit of Carceres' 1971 personal income tax returns.
At this meeting, Caceres offered Yee a "personal settlement" of $500 in
exchange for a favorable resolution of the audit. On a number of subse-
quent occasions, recordings were made of conversations between the tax-
payer and Yee. These recordings were all found to be authorized according
to the regulaations set out in the Internal Revenue Manual. In relevant
part, the regulation states that a non-telephone conversation may be re-
corded with the consent of either party for a period up to thirty days if proper
written authorization is received from the Attorney General. The regula-
tion also provides for emergency approval by the Director of the Internal
Security Division unless the requesting official has an excess of forty-eight
hours to obtain written advance approval from the Attorney Genera' 52
On January 30, 1975, Yee called Caceres and arranged for a meeting
the following day. On January 31, Yee acquired approval from the Di-
rector of the Internal Security Division to monitor the meeting. At the
same time, Yee wrote a request to the Attorney General for authorization
to record conversations for a thirty-day period. Similarly, on February 5,
Yee set up a meeting with the defendant and prior to the meeting acquired
emergency authorization to record the contents. This emergency request
was received despite the earlier request for thirty-day authorization. Both
recordings conclusively showed that Caceres had bribed Yee.
In a California district court, Caceres sought successfully to have the
January 31 and February 6 recordings excluded because they were secured
by emergency authorization under circumstances that allowed Yee to ac-
quire authorization within forty-eight hours before the meeting. The Ninth
Circuit upheld the suppression of the evidence, having found that the emer-
gency did not fall within the meaning of the regulation where the emergency
was a result of "government related scheduling problems.'
53
150 99 S. Ct. 1465 (1979).
151 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE MANUAL 652.22 (in effect January, 1975).
152 Id.
153 United States v. Caceres, 545 F.2d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 1976).
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The Supreme Court reversed, holding that an agency rule must be
designed to protect constitutional rights or be proscribed by statute before
a court can require the agency to abide by it. Citing Lopez v. United States5 4
and United States v. White,"' the court would not allow the fourth amend-
ment prohibiting illegal search and seizures to aid the defendant.
The Caceres decision would appear to limit the reliability of regula-
tions provided in the Internal Revenue Service Manual. However, a close
examination of the case shows that the court was reluctant to uphold a
rigid rule of exclusion because of the conclusiveness of the evidence. Furth-
ermore, the analysis applied was derived from dealing exclusively with
questionable surveillance techniques.
8.02 Handwriting Samples
The Eighth Circuit"' recently held that section 7602 does not give the
Internal Revenue Service authority to compel taxpayers to create hand-
writing samples and furnish them for comparison purposes. This decision
aligns the Eighth Circuit with the Sixth Circuit'57 contra to the holdings of
the Fourth Circuit'58 and its own prior opinion. 5
Section 7601 gives the Service a mandate to investigate persons who
may be liable for taxes and section 7602 provides the authority for the
IRS to conduct such investigations. Section 7602(2) gives the Secretary
authorization to "summon the person liable for tax . . . to appear before
the Secretary . . . and to produce such books, papers, records, or other
data . . . as may be relevant or material" to the IRS investigation. The
question has arisen whether section 7602 authorizes the Service to require
a taxpayer whose potential tax liabilities are under investigation to appear
before the IRS and furnish handwriting samples to the IRS for comparison
purposes. The Circuit Courts lack uniformity in their decisions on this
issue.
In United States v. Brown,60 the Sixth Circuit held that section 7602
does not authorize the Internal Revenue Service to compel the production of
handwriting samples that aren't already in existence at the time of the is-
suance of the summons. In Brown, the Internal Revenue Service received
information that the purported signature of Brown's wife on a joint return
was a forgery. The Internal Revenue Service summoned Brown to give
handwriting samples of his wife's signature, but Brown refused. Where a
taxpayer fails or refuses to obey an administrative subpoena issued by an
1-373 U.S. 427 (1963).
155401 U.S. 745 (1971).
150 United States v. Euge, 587 F.2d (8th Cir. 1978).
157 United States v. Brown, 536 F.2d 117 (6th Cir. 1970).
158 United States v. Robinsky, 547 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1972).
159 United States v. Campbell, 524 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1975).
1" 536 F.2d at 122.
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agent of the IRS, Section 7604 allows the subpoena to be enforced by a
judicial proceeding in the appropriate district court. The Sixth Circuit con-
sidered the context of section 7602 as a whole and then determined that
the Service could not compel Brown to produce the handwriting samples.
"Other data," as used in section 7602(2), should be construed to include
only papers, writings, or records already in existence. The Sixth Circuit
stated that Congress could easily have added the words "other data of what-
ever kind necessary whether in existence or not," had it wanted to au-
thorize the Service to compel the production of handwriting samples not
in existence at the time of the summons.''
A contra view is taken by the Fourth Circuit. In United States v. Rosin-
sky,162 the court held that the Internal Revenue Service did have the power
under section 7602, to compel a taxpayer to produce handwriting samples
for the IRS. Although not expressly allowed in section 7602, the court
held that the authority given to require a taxpayer to appear impliedly car-
ries with it the power to require certain nontestimonial acts on the part of
the taxpayer-witness such as providing voice or handwriting samples.' The
court analogized the administrative summons under section 7602 to a grand
jury in supporting its conclusion. Under a grand jury subpoena, a witness
may be compelled to give handwriting samples and such compulsion does
not violate the fourth or fifth amendments or any common law right of
privacy."'
In 1975, a divided Eighth Circuit, issued an opinion stating that th8
Internal Revenue Service can compel handwriting samples of taxpayers under
section 7602.164 The Campbell court held that the authority to summon
"other data" in section 7602(2) includes the authority to require the tax.
payer to give samples of his handwriting.'65 The Internal Revenue Service's
position was that when Congress used the broad phrase "other data" it
intended to empower the taxing authorities to summon any otherwise per-
missible material required by them to carry out their investigation and
this includes handwriting samples. 6 The Eighth Circuit agreed and added
that the power of the Internal Revenue Service to investigate records and
affairs of taxpayers should be liberally construed.
In Euge,11' an en banc court overruled Campbell and adopted the dis-
senting view of Justice Heaney. The Euge court held that the Internal Reve-
nue Service does not have the authority to compel a taxpayer to create hand-
writing samples and furnish them to the Internal Revenue Service for com-
161 Id. at 122.
162 547 F.2d at 249.
'3Id. at 252.
'"524 F.2d at 604.
x5Id. at 607.
'"Id. at 606.
' 587 F.2d at 25.
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parison purposes under section 7602. Pursuant to a tax investigation, Euge
was served a subpoena commanding him to appear and furnish his hand-
writing samples. After careful consideration, the Eighth Circuit followed
the rationale of Justice Heaney's dissent in Campbell. The court stated
that compelling a person to execute a handwriting sample is a search and
seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment and that the investi-
gatory powers of the Internal Revenue Service are clearly subordinate.
Heaney also attacked the grand jury analogy as a basis for allowing com-
pulsion of handwriting samples distinguishing the functions of the Internal
Revenue Service and the grand jury.
As to the construction of section 7602(2), Heaney stated it should
be strictly construed contra to the holdings of Campbell and Rosinsky. The
court in Euge concluded that Heaney's dissent in Campbell should be fol-
lowed in future Eighth Circuit cases unless the Supreme Court holds other-
wise or unless Congress changes the law.""9
8.03 Frivolous Suit Penalty
The Tax Court looks unkindly on dilatory litigation and in the case
of Wilkinson v. Commissioner,'69 not only did the taxpayer lose the case,
but the court tacked on a $500 frivolous suit penalty under authority of
section 6673. This section and its predecessors have remained nearly dor-
mant since 1926 when this power was granted.7 Now it has become a
new tool to discourage litigation when the main purpose is to delay tax
payment. As the court stated in Clippinger v. Commissioner,""
[E]ach year thousands of taxpayers petition this Court to resolve
legitimate differences between themselves and the Commissioner over
the proper application of the tax laws to their factual situations. Reso-
lution of those differences is unfortunately delayed many times due
to frivolous cases such as this. 1 2
The Tax Court was still reluctant to use this power as late as 1977,
when, in Hatfield v. Commissioner,"" the taxpayer claimed that as a cash
basis taxpayer she had no income because federal reserve notes were only
accounts receivable until the government redeemed them for real money.
The claim was clearly frivolous and a stem warning was given to future
litigants with claims of this sort.
Later, in Clippinger7 '4 the claims also served only a dilatory purpose.
168 587 F.2d at 27.
169 71 T.C. 633 (1979).
170 Rev. Act. of 1924, § 911 as amended by Revenue Act of 1926, § 1000. This power was
first exercised in Coombs v. Com'r, 28 B.T.A. 1216 (1933).
17147 T.C.M. (P-H) 78,107 (1978).
172 ld. at 483.
"7368 T.C. 895 (1977).
1747 T.C.M. (P-H) at 483 (1978).
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There the truck-driving taxpayer had written a pamphlett, "Tired of Being
Ripped Off by Federal Income Taxes," then formed a church in his home,
donating heavily to it. After he filed his petition, he claimed he lost his
church records and so had only the testimony of himself, his niece, and
his ledger to vouch for the church's bona fide existence. However, the
court did not levy the frivolous suit penalty stating that this case went
to trial before the Hatfield decision, but again issued a warning.
Crowder v. Commissioner,"5 another "tax protester" suit, involved
litigation where the taxpayers asserted meritless fourth and fifth amendment
claims, and again the court included the Hatfield warning. Roger D. Wil-
kinson was not so fortunate. His case arose after Hatfield and he admitted
knowledge about that decision. Here, taxpayer refused to present any rec-
ords on his contested itemized deductions. Also, he could not show any
legitimate grounds for potential criminal prosecution after the Service
notified him of past decisions that baseless fifth amendment claims cannot
stand in the way of civil tax liability. 7' The other claims were also frivolous;
such as, a signed return is proof of genuineness, or a right to a jury trial
in a civil tax case.
The court noted the maximum amount of the frivolous suit penalty
had remained at $500 and levied the full amount adding that these costs
are wholly inadequate to indemnify the actual costs incurred in this waste
of limited judicial and administrative resources. 17 7
9.00 Inventory
9.01 Inventory Writedowns
In Thor Power Tool v. Commissioner,' the Supreme Court decided
that the company's writedown of its excess inventory to estimated net
realizable value in conformance with the best accounting practices was not
supported by objective evidence of the inventory's reduced value as re-
quired by Regulation 1.446-1 and was properly disallowed by the Internal
Revenue Service as not clearly reflective of income.
In Thor, 44,000 inventory items, mostly spare parts, were determined
by management to be excess inventory since they were held in excess
of any reasonably foreseeable future demand. The taxpayer wrote this in-
ventory down to its "net realizable value," which, in most cases, was scrap
value. Although Thor wrote down all its excess inventory at once, it did
not immediately scrap the articles or sell them at reduced prices. A tax-
payer and the Service are confronted with two general requirements when
determining inventory: the inventory method must conform as nearly as
17547 T.C.M. (P-H) 78,273 (1978).
171 See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374 (1951); Figueiredo v. Comm'r, 54 T.C.
1508, 1512 (1970).
177 71 T.C. at 633.
178439 U.S. 522 (1979).
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possible with the best accounting practice and it must clearly reflect income.
While section 471 requires only that an accounting practice conform as
nearly as possible to best accounting practice, Regulation 1.446-1(a) (2)
states that no method of accounting is acceptable unless, in the opinion
of the Commissioner, it clearly reflects income. Thor protested that its
write-down of slow or non-moving inventory was mandated by generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP). Under these rules, the market
value of inventory is its net realizable value. Thor contended that it was
required by the Regulations to set its closing inventory at the lower-of-cost-or-
market value and that the writedown accurately reflected the market value
of the excess items.
Thor relied upon Regulation 1.446-1 (a) (2) to show that its writedown
clearly reflected income. This Regulation states that a method of account-
ing which reflects the consistent application of generally accepted account-
ing principles will ordinarily be regarded as clearly reflecting income. Thor
interpreted this provision to create a presumption that a taxpayer who
shows his accounting method is proper has clearly reflected his income.
However, the Internal Revenue Service asserted that under the lower-
of-cost-or-market-value method the market value equals the replacement
cost of the goods. Inventory may be valued below market price only if (1)
the taxpayer in the normal course of business actually offers merchandise
for sale at prices lower than replacement cost, or (2) the goods are un-
salable at normal prices or unsalable in the normal fashion because of de-
fects, damage, imperfections or other similar causes."7 9 Since the market
value of the excess goods under the Regulations was their regular selling
price, the Internal Revenue Service protested that the writedown was im-
proper. The Supreme Court agreed with the Service.
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court upheld the Service's
disallowance of the writedown. Under Regulation 1.471-4, which gov-
erns the lower-of-cost-or-market method of inventory accounting."' 0 a tax-
payer must substantiate a below-market inventory by objective evidence.
Not only did Thor fail to sell its excess inventory or offer it for sale at
prices below cost, but, more importantly, Thor failed to provide any ob-
jective evidence to demonstrate that the excess inventory had the market
value management ascribed to it. Rather, the formula governing the write-
down was derived from management's collective business experience, but
the court concluded that the Treasury Regulations do not permit that kind
179 ld.
180 Under the lower-of-cost-or-market inventory valuation method, a taxpayer compares the
market value of each item in his closing inventory with its cost. If an item's market value
has dropped to below its cost, the taxpayer enters the item on his closing inventory at
that lower value. The write-down results in immediate tax benefits since it decreases closing
inventory, thereby increasing cost of goods sold and reducing taxable income.
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of evidence. In Thor's case the only way it could establish the inventory's
value would be to scrap the excess items at once.
The dilemma facing Thor and other manufacturers that the Supreme
Court refused to alleviate was that planned overruns or excess inventory
items must be carried for years at cost until sold or sold prematurely to
establish a closed transaction. Otherwise, states the Supreme Court, to
permit a write-off for excess inventory would enable taxpayers to unilaterally
pay the tax they desired and such a choice would render the Code un-
enforceable.
A careful reading of Thor is not a blanket denial of inventory write-
downs. The court accepted the validity of the concept of writedowns, but
objected to the use of unsupported percentages based on management
estimates. The court seemed to be looking for hard data to support the
estimated percentages. Careful and complete documentation in support of
any inventory writedown is a must. Since the Supreme Court's decision is
binding on all taxpayers in similar fact situations, any writedown of excess
stock or other market writedowns not conforming to the regulations are
not acceptable for tax purposes.
10.00 Pension, Profit Sharing and Stock Ownership Plans
10.01 Lump Sum Distributions
When a taxpayer receives a qualified lump sum distribution, he has
three tax-saving alternatives. First, he may treat the- pre-1974 portion as
capital gain and use the ten-year forward averaging method on the ordinary
income portion; or, second, he may treat the entire amount as ordinary
income electing the ten-year averaging method for the entire distribution.
Thirdly, he may rollover the distribution into an Individual Retirement
Account recognizing no current income.
Under the third alternative, the portion of the distribution which is
not from the taxpayer's own contributions to the earlier Keogh or em-
ployee benefit plan may be transferred into an I.R.A., I.R.A. annuity, or
I.R.A. retirement bond. The rollover election must be made within sixty
days of receipt. The advantage of the rollover is that the tax is figured
only on the amounts withdrawn out of the I.R.A. plan. (However, when this
method is used, the special ten-year averaging and capital gain treatment of
the funds is forfeited. To avoid adverse consequences, withdrawals may
only be made between the ages of 59 and 70 and the balance of the
fund must be distributed in the year taxpayer reaches 70 . Under this
alternative, there are also estate tax advantages since I.R.A. plans are
excluded from a taxpayer's gross estate under section 2039(C).
10.02 Partnerships and Corporations
Section 401 (a) provides that pension, profitsharing, and stock-bonus
plans must not discriminate in favor of employees who are officers, share-
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holders, or highly compensated individuals. However, in spite of the fact
that sections 414(b) and (c) provide that employees of partnerships under
common control and controlled groups of corporations shall be treated
as employed by a single employer; in recent private letter rulings, the IRS
stated that only that portion of the total employee compensation equal to
each medical corporation's proportionate interest is considered for determin-
ing qualification under section 401 (a)."'
That ruling concerned a group of doctors involved in a general partner-
ship at a medical clinic. Each wanted to form his own individual corpo-
ration which, in turn, would become the general partner."2 The employees
of the original partnership would continue working under the new partner-
ship receiving compensation and profit-sharing plan benefits, but each doctor
would now become an employee of his own respective corporation and
not of the new partnership. 18 3
Corporations participating in a partnership or joint venture together
are required to consider all the employees of the partnership to determine
whether the profit-sharing plan qualifies under section 401(a) since the
enmployees of the partnership are considered to be employees of each
partner. "' Therefore, each partner-corporation need only take into account
its distributive share of the compensation paid to employees of the part-
nership. 85
In effect, section 414(c) was read with a gloss as though only em-
ployees of separate partnerships under common control must be consid-
ered in the aggregate. Under the facts here, since the doctors' corporations
formed only one partnership, only each partner's share need be considered.""
10.03 Defined-Benefit Plans
For the owner-employee, Keogh and I.R.A. plans based on a
profit-sharing formula have become well known, but there is an alternative.
Section 401 (j) provides for defined-benefit plans for the self-employed. A
defined-benefit Keogh plan is a true pension plan because the contributions
must continue based on a previously set formula regardless of the owner-
employee's net income. Also, section 401(j) (6) clearly sets out that this
type of plan is not subject to the fifteen percent-$7,500 maximum limit.
The first step in the computation is to determine the annual income to be
received at retirement. This is computed using the table in section 401
181 Letter Ruling 7905020 (1979); See also, Letter Ruling 7904037 (1979), which has same
text.
262 Id.
183 Id.
184 Rev. Rul. 68-370, 1968-2 C.B. 174.
1Id.
iBO Letter Rulings 7905020 and 7905037.
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(j) (3) (A). 8' For example, a taxpayer earning $60,000 per year who
commenced participation in the plan at age fifty would use the three percent
figure of $50,000 ($50,000 is the maximum compensation allowed in the
computation) times .03 or $1,500. Assuming retirement at sixty-five,
there are fifteen years times $1,500 so taxpayer can build up an annuity
income of $22,500 per year. The next step would be to determine the
amount required to be deposited annually that would be sufficient to ac-
cumulate enough in the fifteen years before retirement to pay an annuity
of $22,500 per year. In this case, the annual deduction would be well
over $9,000 in order to accumulate enough capital for the annuity fund.
The Code's breakdown of the participation ages is in five-year gaps, but
the proposed regulations have a single year breakdown. However, the plan
must cover employees with three or more years of service (such as tax-
payer's spouse if a bona fide employer) and is subject to the nondis-
crimination rules of section 401 (a) (4).
10.04 Disqualifications - Attorney's Lien Attachment
Section 401(a)(13) provides that a qualified employee trust must
contain a clause against assignment or alienation of the benefits with certain
exceptions. The Treasury Regulations further explain this, stating, " . . .
a trust will not be qualified unless the plan of which the trust is part pro-
vides that benefits provided under the plan may not be anticipated, assigned
(either in law or equity), alienated or subject to attachment, garnishment,
levy, execution or other legal or equitable process." '188 A dilemma arises
when local law allows an attachment that is not one of the exceptions to
this broad prohibition.
The facts in a private letter ruling illustrate how easily the plan could
be disqualified. 89 One of the plan's participants contested a denial of a
claim for disability benefits. 19 The participant agreed to a written contingent
fee of one-third to his attorney, and prior to trial the pension plan agreed
to pay the participant a disability pension. The attorney requested to have
18? (A) Table.-For purposes of paragraph (2), the applicable percentage for any individual
for any plan year shall be based on the percentage shown on the following table opposite
his age when his current period of participation in the plan began.
Age when Applicable
participation began: percentages
30 or less ................................................................................................ 6.5
35 ............................................................................................................ 5.4
40 .......................................................................................................... 4.4
45 ............................................................................................................ 3.6
50 ............................................................................................................ 3.0
55 ........................................................................................................... 2.5
60 or over .............................................................................................. 2.0
'
8 8 Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a) - 13(b).
189 Letter Ruling 792005 (1979).
290 Id.
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a lien imposed to satisfy his contingent fee payment under a law which
allowed the attorney of record to have a lien on plaintiff's right of action.
The plan opposed this, so the attorney asked to have payment due partici-
pant paid to the court clerk for one-third distribution to the attorney.
The ruling stated that there is no exception to the anti-alienation re-
quirements for an attorney's lien, so an entire plan would be disqualified
if the benefits were attached to enforce an attorney's lien for his services
in obtaining this benefit distribution. However, some courts have allowed
attachment of plan benefits for enforcing a participant's family support
obligations, but the Internal Revenue Service felt such holdings do not
extend to an attorney's lien.
This dilemma could also appear after the participant or beneficiary
has begun to receive benefits under the plan, because these assignments
are not voluntary.'
10.05 Payment by Note
Section 404(a) provides that contributions "paid" to employees' trust
are deductible.' This includes payments made in the form of property. In
a recent letter ruling9 a promissory note issued by a third party was con-
sidered sufficient payment. This is contrasted with prior case law which
disallowed promissory notes as payment deeming them to be only evidences
of indebtedness. In Don E. Williams Co. v. Commissioner,"' the promissory
note was held not to be within the meaning of "paid." In that case, the
directors of the company contributed promissory notes of the employer
company into the profit-sharing trust and took deductions based on the
accrual system of accounting. Later, the notes were redeemed by check.
The Internal Revenue Service allowed deductions only at the time of the
payment by check, and not when the note was issued. There, the note was
not a payment, but only a promise to pay, hence "evidence of indebtedness,"
there being no actual outlay of cash or property.
However, if the promissory note is issued by a third party, it will be
considered property and the employer may deduct its fair market value. 5
The facts in the Letter Ruling involved a subsidiary that sold its subsidiary
to a group of Canadian citizens in return for a promissory note which was
contributed to a pension fund shared with its parent corporation." The
Internal Revenue Service arrived at a sensible conclusion, albeit circuitously,
191 Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a) - 13(d).
192 Rev. Rul. 69-217, 1969-2 C.B. 59.
93 Letter Ruling 7852116 (1979).
194429 U.S. 569 (1977).
195 Rev. Rul. 69-217, 1969-2 C.B. at 59.
'"Letter Ruling 7852116 (1979).
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by treating this situation as analogous to installment sales contract pro-
visions.197
In that situation, third-party notes have been held to be payment by
property and not "evidences of indebtedness."198 Accordingly, the subsidi-
ary's note was a deductible transfer of property and hence "paid" for pur-
pose of section 404.
This writer believes there is a simpler analysis available. In the Wil-
liams 99 case, the note was a note payable on the employer's books, thus
it was an obligation owed to another and thus evidence of indebtedness,
whereas in the latter situation the note was property when it was a note
receivable on the employer's books and thus an obligation owed by another
to the employer.
10.06 Limitations on Benefits Raised
The limitations for defined benefit or contribution plans set forth in
the Code are subject to administrative cost-of-living adjustments. Effective
January 1, 1979, the IRS has set the maximum annual benefit for defined-
benefit plans at $98,l10000 for purposes of section 415(b)(1) (A), and the
maximum annual addition for defined contribution plans at $32,700") for
purposes of section 415(c) (I) (A). These new limits apply only to these
sections and their respective alternate limits have not been changed."'2
These figures are the first computed by the Internal Revenue Service
using the Labor Department's "All Urban Index," and because of this
change the 1974 base period has been adjusted for comparison with this
index." ' Adjustments to conform to these new provisions do not require de-
termination letters." '
11.00 Corporations
11.01 Liquidation - Basis Valuation
In a recent Letter Ruling,20 5 the IRS has disagreed with the Tax Court
regarding the applicable treatment for determining basis valuations of assets
acquired by a new organization in plans initiated to buy out co-owners in
a closely held corporation. The Tax Court, in Stevens Pass, Inc. v. Com-
1'9 Id. The installment sales contract provisions are set forth in § 453. See 453(b)(2), and
Treas. Regs. §§ 1.453-1(c)(1), 1.453-4(b).
198Georgia-Florida Land Co. v. Comm'r, 16 B.T.A. 1253 (1929); Mercedes Frances Free-
man Trust v. Comm'r, 36 T.C. 779 (1961); and Holmes v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 53 (1970).
199 429 U.S. at 569.
-0o I.R.-2095 (Feb. 15, 1979), 3 Pension Plan Guide 17017 N.
201 I.R.-2095.
M2 See, §§ 415(b)(1)(B), (c)(1)(B).
20 I.R.-2095.
2t04d.
205Letter Ruling 7905011 (1978).
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missioner,'° allowed the new corporation to raise the basis of the corporate
assets to reflect its purchase price by treating the transaction as a sale under
section 334(b) (2). Here, two shareholders of a closely held corporation
attempted to buy out the co-owner of the old corporation by forming a
new corporation in which the two old corporations, in turn, purchased all
shares of the old corporation and soon thereafter liquidated the old corpo-
ration pursuant to section 332. The new corporation computed its basis
in the assets it acquired through liquidation of its wholly owned subsidiary
under section 334(b) (2), and the Tax Court accepted this basis compu-
tation rejecting the Internal Revenue Service's argument that the entire
transaction should be treated as a section 351 exchange.
With the Stevens Pass decision as background, the IRS restated its
argument in Letter Ruling 7905011,1°1 where it refused to allow a new
corporation to set up the basis of assets which the new corporation
acquired from the old corporation in a closely held corporate buy-
out setting. The situation involved three actively employed shareholders
of the old corporation who formed a new corporation which acquired all
the stock of the old corporation and liquidated the old corporation
in order to buy out the passive investors' interests. The Internal Revenue
Service recognized that these transactions did not qualify as a reorganiza-
tion under section 368, siince the requisite continuity of interest on the
part of persons owning stock of the old corporation before the transaction
was lacking. Yet, the Internal Revenue Service did consider the transactions
characteristic of a section 351 transfer, where the basis of the assets in the
old corporation is carried over to the new corporation.
In analyzing this situation, the Internal Revenue Service noted that
the economic substance of a transaction or series of transactions "must
govern rather than the time sequence or form in which the transaction is
cast."208
Section 332 provides for the complete liquidation of subsidiaries by par-
ent corporations. Generally, under section 334(b)(1) the basis of the
assets of the subsidiary will be carried over to the parent. However, section
334(b) (2) provides an exception in the amount of the basis where at least
eighty percent of the voting stock and eighty percent of all other classes
of stock of the subsidiary were acquired by the parent by "purchase" dur-
ing a maximum time period of twelve months. Under this exception the
parent's basis in the acquired subsidiary's assets is the parent corporation's
adjusted basis in the stock of the subsidiary. The term "purchase" is de-
fined in section 334(b)(3) and excludes the acquisition of stock in a
section 351 transfer.
2-048 T.C. 532 (1967).
w7fLetter Ruling 7905011 (1978).
208 Id.
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Relying on this definition of the term "purchase," the Internal Revenue
Service reasoned that by treating the formation of the new corporation and
the sale of their old corporate stock to the new corporation as one overall
plan, and since the three shareholders of the new corporation owned more
than twenty percent of the old corporation before the transaction (they held
thirty-four percent of the old corporation stock), then this qualified as a
section 351 transfer and was not a purchase of stock under section 334(b)
(3). Since the stock was not acquired by purchase, section 334(b) (2) (B)
prevented section 334(b)(2) from being applicable in determining the
basis valuations. Thus, the general rule for basis determination in complete
liquidations of subsidiaries contained in section 334(b)(1) was applied
rather than the exception.
While the IRS focused its ruling on the fact that eighty percent of
the stock was not acquired by purchase because the stockholders of the
new corporation owned more than twenty percent of the stock of the old
corporation and transferred it under section 351 to the new corporation,
such leaves open the possibility that a purchase for basis valuation could
be upheld in a similar factual setting if the stockholders owned and trans-
ferred less than twenty percent of the old corporation to a new corporation.
In this situation, the exception (the stepped-up basis calculation) for basis
valuation might still apply.
11.02 Brother-Sister Corporations
Disagreement between the Tax Court and the Internal Revenue Service
continues concerning the eighty percent control test applied to brother-
sister corporations. Recently, in Allen Oil Co., Inc. v. Commissioner,' the
Tax Court again rejected the Service's arguments and held that each of the
five or fewer individual shareholders must be a shareholder of each corpora-
tion in order to meet the eighty percent ownership requirements of section
1563 (a) (2) (A) for brother-sister controlled group status. The Internal
Revenue Service, however, along with the Fourth21 and Eighth21' Circuits,
maintains that eighty percent ownership test is met if any one or more share-
holders owns at least eighty percent of the outstanding stock of each corpo-
ration.
Section 11(b) establishes a surtax exemption of $100,000 for every
corporation. However, in the case of certain controlled corporations defined
by section 1563, section 1561(a)(1) permits only one surtax exemption
to the entire controlled group. For this reason, controversy has developed
in interpreting the definitions outlined in section 1563-particularly in
determining how to apply the eighty percent ownership test required for
209 1979 T.C.M. (P-H) 79088.
210 Fairfax Auto Parts of No. Va., Inc. v. Comni'r, 548 F.2d 501 (4th Cir. 1977).
211 T.L. Hunt, Inc. v. Comm'r, 45 T.C.M. (P-H) 76221, rev'd and rem'd 562 F.2d 532 (8th
Cir. 1977).
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establishing brother-sister corporations. A control group exists when
two or more corporations are "owned" by five or fewer individuals. To
constitute "ownership," two tests-the eighty percent and the fifty percent
tests-must be met.
In applying the eighty percent test, the Tax Court holds that each of
the five or fewer individuals must be shareholders of each of the corpora-
tions involved.212 The Internal Revenue Service takes the opposite position
maintaining that eighty percent control can be established when any one or
more of the individuals owns at least eighty percent of the stock of a cor-
poration. In Allen Oil Co., Inc. v. Commissioner,"' the Internal Revenue
Service argued that the eighty percent test was met when one of the in-
dividuals alone owned the required eighty percent stock in a second corpo-
ration. The Tax Court disagreed, however, despite the fact that its similar
decisions in two prior cases were reversed by the Fourth1 4 and Eighth
Circuits, 2 5 and that two similar cases are pending appeal in the Fifth l1
and Ninth Circuits.2 1 1 Since appeal from Allen would lie in the Second Cir-
cuit, the Tax Court maintains its position because "the Second Circuit has
yet to speak on this point.21 8
To support its contention, the Internal Revenue Service relies on
Regulation 1.1563-1 (a) (3) which defines a brother-sister control group as
a group of two or more corporations where the same five or fewer persons
own, either "singly or in combination, the required eighty percent out-
standing stock. The first case to challenge this regulation was Fairfax Auto
Parts of Northern Virginia, Inc. v. Commissioner, 9 where the Tax Court
held "that for a person's stock ownership to be taken into account for pur-
poses of the eighty percent test that person must own stock in each member
of the brother-sister controlled group."2 0
To reach this result, the Tax Court returned to the key language of
section 1563(a) (2) (A) and, concentrating on the words "if five or fewer
persons . . . own," pointed out that this clause applied both to the eighty
percent and to the fifty percent ownership test. Since ownership of stock
in each corporation by each person was a requisite to the fifty percent test,
the Tax Court analogized that the same interpretation of the clause was
212 Id.
is 1979 T.C.M. (P-H) at 351.
214 548 F.2d at 501.
215 522 F.2d at 532.
2148 Delta Metalforming Co., Inc. v. Comm'r, 47 T.C.M. (P-H) 78354, on appeal (5th Cir.,
Dec. 6, 1978).
217 Charles Baloin Co. v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 620 (1977), on appeal (9th Cir., April 19,
1978).
28 1979 T.C.M. (P-H) at 351.
21'Fairfax Auto Parts of No. Va., Inc. v. Comm'r, 65 T.C. 798 (1976), rev'd and rem'd,
548 F.2d 501 (4th Cir. 1977).
220 65 T.C. at 803.
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intended to apply to the eighty percent ownership test as well.22' The Tax
Court also dismissed the Service's argument that such an interpretation
would provide "an easy path on which to bypass controlled group status
in the brother-sister context."2 ' The Tax Court found the regulation to be
invalid to the extent that it contradicted the Tax Court's interpretation of
the eighty percent test.
In direct contradiction of the Fourth" and Eighth 2' Circuits' position,
the Tax Court has continually reiterated its Fairfax holding not only in
the recent Allen case, but in Charles Baloian Co., Inc. v. Commissioner..
and in Delta Metalforming Co., Inc. v. Commissioner2 ' as well. These two
latter cases are awaiting appeal in the Ninth and Fifth Circuits, respectively.
Thus, the manner of application of the eighty percent ownership re-
quirement for determination of brother-sister controlled group status remains
a recurring issue, with the proponents of both interpretations adhering to
their respective views.
11.03 Reserve for Bad Debts
In Thor Power Tool,"7 the Supreme Court held that additions to a
reserve for bad debts cannot be made if the reserve is increased to an
amount in excess of that permitted by the six-year moving average of past
bad debts. Accrual basis taxpayers can choose one of two accounting meth-
ods for their business bad debts. Under the specific debt method, a tax-
payer deducts each debt that became worthless during the taxable year.2 8
The other method available to accrual-basis taxpayers to account for bad
debts is the reserve method." 9 Under the reserve method, a taxpayer estab-
lishes an anticipated bad debt account. As debts become worthless, they
are charged against the reserve. Similarly, if the taxpayer recovers a debt
previously used to reduce the reserve, he does not report it as income, but
adds that amount to the reserve. At the close of the year, the taxpayer is
permitted to reinstate the reserve to an amount sufficient to cover antici-
pated bad debt losses for the following year. Only if these additions are
reasonable will the Service permit them to be deducted from income.
Section 166(a) (1) requires the taxpayer to consider the total amount
of debts outstanding at the close of the taxable year in determining the
reasonableness of an addition to a bad debt reserve. However, the previous
221 Id.
222 Id. at 809.
22s 548 F.2d at 501.
224 562 F.2d at 532.
225 68 T.C. at 620.
22647 T.C.M. (P-H) at 1474.
22? Thor Power Tool Co. v. Comm'r, 99 S. Ct. 773 (1979).
228 Black Motor Co., Inc. v. Comm'r, 41 B.T.A. 300 (1940).
229Section 166(a)(1).
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bad debt experience of the taxpayer is the critical element in the Black
Motor 3. method. This method reviews the taxpayer's own experience with
losses in previous years and establishes the percentage of accounts receiv-
able that is likely to become worthless during the present taxable year. The
percentage is then multiplied by the current year's accounts receivable at
the close of the taxable year. The number obtained is a reasonable reserve
for bad debts and if the taxpayer's reserve has fallen below this amount, he
can make up the difference.
Thor used the reserve method, and during 1965 claimed a deduction
for $136,150 as supported by three levels of management. However, the
Commissioner ruled that the deduction was excessive and computed a "rea-
sonable" addition to Thor's reserve by using the six-year moving average
formula derived from Black Motor Co. This figure computed by the Com-
missioner was $61,359.20 and, accordingly, he disallowed the remaining
$74,790 of Thor's claimed deduction. The courts have uniformly held
that the Commissioner's determination of a reasonable addition must be
sustained unless the taxpayer proves that the Commissioner abused his
discretion. The Black Motor Formula has been almost universally accepted
for forty years, enjoying the favor of all three branches of government.
While Thor dealt with the ceiling on the annual additions to the bad
debt reserve, the Service is also using this decision to end the former flexi-
bility in making additions that were less than the ceiling amounts.
Now the Internal Revenue Service says that a business which com-
putes a reserve for bad debts, under the formula method, must add to the
reserve and deduct an amount each year which is necessary to bring the
reserve up to the Black Motor formula amount.231 In Revenue Ruling 79-88,
All that Glitters Corp., an accrual method manufacturer of costume jewelry,
used the reserve method for bad debts. Although Glitters could have in-
creased its reserve by $260 in 1974 and claimed such amount as a deduction,
it only increased its reserve by $150 in 1974 to avoid losing the benefit of
an operating loss carry forward that could not be carried past 1974.
A taxpayer may not claim, in a subsequent taxable year, a deduction
he should have claimed in an earlier year.2" Since Glitters Corp. could
have increased the reserve by $260 at the end of 1974, the Internal Revenue
Service ruled that this amount should have been deducted in that year. The
addition to the reserve made by Glitters in 1974 was inadequate and caused
the 1975 addition to be inflated. The Service denied a deduction for the
$110 difference ($260-$150) in 1975. A taxpayer who uses the reserve
method may not manipulate bad debt deductions from year to year in
2 8D41 B.T.A. at 300.
231 Rev. Rul. 79-88, 1979-11 I.R.B. 5.
2 3
2Id.
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order to maximize tax savings without regard to the Black Motor formula."'
Thus, businesses which use the reserve method do not have as great a
flexibility in deducting annual additions to the reserve for bad debts.
11.04 Waiver of Family Attribution Rules
The Service and the Tax Court have recently presented new approaches
to interpreting the waiver of family attribution rules of section 302(c) (2)
(A) when implemented by estates and trusts in complete redemption set-
tings. In Revenue Ruling 79-67,234 the Service approved a procedure where-
by an estate can avoid the family attribution waiver problems in certain
limited factual settings. This ruling varies from the prior Service position
which limits the use of the waiver provisions in section 302(c) (2) (A) to
family members only and not to an estate or trust for the benefit of a
family member. The Tax Court in Rodgers P. Johnson Trust v. Com-
missioner,3 ' extended this position and now permits trusts to join with
estates and individual family members in availing themselves of the waiver
provisions of the family attribution rules.
Section 302(a) generally provides that capital gain treatment shall
be given to the stockholder in transactions in which a corporation redeems
all its stock held by the stockholder. However, section 302(b) (3) also
requires that the shareholder must terminate his entire interest in the cor-
poration including any stock interest constructively owned specified under
section 302(c) (2). This second requirement causes problems in the family
owned corporation where the corporation seeks to redeem all the stock
of one family member but where the family member has attributed to him
the stock owned by other family members by section 318. To solve this
dilemma, section 302(c)(2)(A) outlines a series of requirements that the
retiring family member can meet to waive the constructive stock ownership
provision of section 318, and to thereby meet the termination of share-
holder's interest requirement of section 302(b) (3).
The Service and the courts disagree as to treatment when an estate
or trust owns stock in the family-owned corporation, has it redeemed, and
seeks to make the waiver of family attribution election under section
302(c) (2) applicable to the estate or trust. The Service has consistently
limited applicability of section 302 to family members only. Thus, the
Service treats any distributions received by estates and trusts in complete
redemptions where constructive stock ownership rules apply as dividends.
In Revenue Ruling 59-233'"6 which dealt with a trust, the Service
stated that the waiver of family attribution rules was not available, because
2331Id.
234 1979-1 C.B. 128.
235 71 T.C. No. 84, 71 Tax Ct. Rep. Dec. 71.84 (1979).
336 1959-2 C.B. 106.
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trusts are deemed to own the corporate stock by virtue of section 318 (a) (2)
(B) rather than by application of section 318(a) (1). Section 302(c) (2)
(A) was limited only to distributees who owned their stock by the applica-
tion of section 318(a)(1).
Revenue Ruling 68-38821 prohibited an estate from applying section
302(c) (2) (A)'s waiver of family attribution rules. Additionally, the In-
ternal Revenue Service disallowed waiver applicability to the individual
as well, where, as here, the estate had transferred the stock to the family
member who had it redeemed by the corporation, filed the proper waiver
agreement with the Service, and paid the estate for the stock with the
redemption proceeds. The Internal Revenue Service considered the series
of transactions to be "transitory and without economic substance. In reality,
the corporation will be considered to have redeemed the stock from the
estate."
38
The Internal Revenue Service followed this same line of reasoning
in Crawford v. Commissioner.29 However, the Tax Court disagreed and
held that estates could avail themselves of the waiver-of-attribution
provisions of section 302(c) (2), since estates fell within the term "distribu-
tee" in section 302(c) (2) (A) (iii). The court rejected the Service's limited
definition of "distributee" and indicated concern that the Service's position
"will prevent a family member who receives his interest in a corporation
through inheritance from terminating this interest in a redemption qualify-
ing under section 302(b)(3) unless the stock is first distributed to him
by the estate." The court went on to say that the Internal Revenue Service's
position "merely put a premium on tax planning and set a trap for the
unwary.
24 0
As to trusts, the Tax Court, in Robin Haft Trust v. Commissioner4
was first faced with the issue of whether trusts can fie the waiver agreement
of section 302(c) (2) (A) (iii). While the Robin Haft decision did not di-
rectly address that issue, the court did distinguish the estate setting of
Crawford from that of trusts and specifically stated that they "are not decid-
ing that a trust cannot file the agreement. 2 4 2
Against this background of cases and Service Rulings, the Tax Court
received its opportunity this year in Rodgers P. Johnson Trust2'4 to fully
address the trust issue. A testamentary trust was created by Mr. Johnson's
will and named his son as beneficiary. While the son himself owned no
237 1968-2 C.B. 122.
288 1959-2 C.B. at 106.
239 59 T.C. 830 (1973).
240 Id.; See also, Rickey v. United States, 427 F. Supp. 484 (W.D. La. 1976).
241 62 T.C. 145 (1974).
22 Id. at 149.
243 71 Tax Ct. Rep. Dec. at 525.
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stock in the corporation, his mother, Mrs. Johnson, did own several shares
which under section 318 (a) ( 1 ) (ii), were attributed to her son. These shares
were then reattributed to the trust under section 318(a) (3) (B) (i). When
the stock was redeemed by the corporation, the trust and the son each
filed agreements with the Internal Revenue Service under section 302
(c) (2) (A) (ii) to waive the family attribution rules. The Service repeated
its Crawford arguments, but the Tax Court held that the trusts as well as
individuals could avail themselves of the waiver provision. The Court again
centered its conclusion on the term, "distributee," in section 302(c) (2)
and refused to limit its applicability only to family members in the absence
of express language in the Code provision itself. "
The Tax Court indicated that a repurchase of stock in the corporation
by the beneficiary might be treated as a reacquisition by the trust itself due
to the attribution of ownership provisions of section 3 18(a) (3) (B) (i). The
court, however, stated:
[t]his issue is not before us and we do not decide it. In the unlikely
event that petitioner distributes its assets and ceases to exist before
the ten-year period expires, a question would arise whether the waiver
filed by [the beneficiary] would bind him as a transferee of petitioner's
assets.2"5
While the Tax Court has granted use of waiver provisions under section
302(c) (2) (A) to both estates and trusts in addition to the family members
themselves, the Internal Revenue Service continues to limit the waiver pro-
vision's availability to individuals and not to entities. In Revenue Ruling
79-67,46 however, the Service provided a method by which estates can
avoid the waiver of family attribution problems in specific factual settings.
In this ruling, a son and his father's estate owned the family corporation
in which the son was active and knowledgeable. The son's mother was
the sole beneficiary of the father's estate. The estate transferred its shares
to the corporation. The mother retained the proceeds from the redemption
and sought to waive the family attribution rules. The IRS accepted her
waiver agreement and held that the mother had completely terminated her
interest in the corporation. Therefore, the redemption was treated as an
exchange under section 302(a). Since the mother's principal purpose in
acquiring the stock was to afford her son complete ownership of the cor-
poration, and not to avoid federal income taxes, the Service allowed the
preferred capital gain tax treatment to the transaction.
The Service distinguished this Revenue Ruling from its previous decis-
ion in Revenue Ruling 68-388.41 Although the rulings involved similar
'" Id. at 532.
243 Id. at 531.
'4 1979-1 C.B. at 128.
24 1968-2 C.B. at 122.
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factual settings, the distinguishing factor seemed to be that here the mother
transferred no assets to the estate in exchange for the stock, while in
Revenue Ruling 68-388, the mother transferred the redemption proceeds
that she received to the estate in exchange for the stock.
11.05 Taxable Boot
To recognize taxable boot in a transfer action under section 351, the
substance of transfer must show that the transferor corporation received
something besides stock that it didn't already have. In Wham Construction
Co., Inc. v. Commissioner,"8 the Fourth Circuit has clarified the definition
of "other property" in determining what is taxable boot.
Section 351(A) allows one or more persons to transfer property to
a corporation solely in exchange for its stock, and if those persons are in
control of the corporation after the exchange they will receive fully tax-
free treatment. However, if, in addition to the stock or securities for assets,
the transferor receives money or "other property" from the transferee cor-
poration, gain will be recognized to the extent of the other property. In
Wham Construction,"4 9 the court held that the liability of one division of a
corporation wasn't "other property" requiring recognition of gain or loss.
Prior to organization of the present Wham Construction Co., Inc., two
brothers initially operated the construction company as a partnership, ac-
quiring later an asphalt paving business. In 1959, the brothers incorporated
these businesses as one, but still operated them as two separate entities each
with its own bank account and separate books. Only one capital account
for both businesses was maintained on the construction company books.
Since no net income was reflected on the asphalt division books, advances
were made by the construction division to the asphalt division which were
reflected on the asphalt division books as money "owed" the construction
division.
In 1966, the brothers separated their one corporate house into two.
They organized Wham Asphalt Company, Inc., which issued all of its capital
stock to Wham Construction in exchange for cash, receivables, inventory,
and capital assets which, net of certain liabilities, would permit continu-
ation of the asphalt paving business. Listed on the new asphalt company
books was an account payable to the parent construction company of
$160,402. Several months later, the asphalt company paid this amount to
the parent.
The Service contended that this payment was ordinary income (some
of the property was depreciated property triggering the recapture provisions
of section 1245) to the parent, taxable because of section 351 (B) as
"other property."
24844 A.F.T.R. 2d 5260 (1979).
24g9 d.
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The Fourth Circuit reasoned that if Construction had merely loaned
its subsidiary operating capital, there would have been no income to Wham
on repayment. In effect, all Asphalt had done was return some of the
cash and receivables it had received from Construction on incorporation.25
Therefore, repayment of an inter-company account balance will not
be characterized as "boot" and as a result will not trigger income to trans-
feror.
11.06 Exemption for Franchisee Association
Settling a conflict between the Second and Seventh Circuits, the Su-
preme Court ruled, six to three, that an association of Midas Muffler dealers
does not qualify as a tax-exempt business league and denies non-industry-
wide associations the tax-exempt status of business leagues.2"1 In Pepsi-
Cola Bottlers' Ass'n v. United States, 25 2 the Seventh Circuit held that an
association whose members were engaged in the bottling and sale of a
single franchised soft-drink product, and whose activities were directed to
the more efficient production and sale of that product, qualified for ex-
emption from the federal income tax as a business league under section
501 (c) (6). In National Muffler, 5 ' the Second Circuit affirmed a district
court finding that an association of Midas Muffler franchisees was not a
business league and not entitled to exemption within the meaning of section
501 (c) (6).
The organization was formed by Midas Muffler franchised dealers to
negotiate with Midas and has been successful in obtaining changes in the
standard Midas franchise agreement. In 1972, its bylaws were amended to
eliminate the requirement that its members be Midas franchisees. How-
ever, despite an announced purpose to promote the interests of all muffler
dealers, the organization never recruited nor acquired any member who
was not a Midas franchisee.
The Pepsi-Cola Bottler's Association was formed in 1949 "to promote,
extend, further protect and improve the trade and business of bottling and
selling Pepsi-Cola." The Internal Revenue Service rejected its application
for tax-exempt status on the ground that it failed to represent the line of
business of bottling all soft drinks, and it benefited only its own members
and therefore did not benefit the line of business in general. However, in
1966, the Seventh Circuit granted the association a tax exemption based
2 50 1d. at 5261.
251 National Muffler Dealer's Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
252 369 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1966).
253 Under § 501 (a), an organization described in subsection (c) is exempt from taxation.
Section 501 (c) (6) provides that certain organizations are referred to in § 501 (a), in-
cluding "business leagues, chambers of commerce, real estate boards, boards of trade, or pro-
fessional football leagues, not organized for profit and no part of the net earnings of which
inures to the benefit of any private shareholders."
254 565 F.2d 845 (2nd Cir. 1978).
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on the reasoning that a business league need not be devoted entirely to
general public welfare. Because the group contributed to the improvement
of the Pepsi-Cola bottling business, it also benefited the general consumer
public. The court held that the IRS line-of-business requirement was un-
reasonable and unsupported by legislative history. Promptly following this
decision, the IRS in Revenue Ruling 68-182255 announced it would not
follow the Pepsi decision and reaffirmed the validity of its line-of-business
standard.
Upon granting certiorari to resolve this conflict among the circuits,
the Supreme Court focused on the key issue of the validity of a Treasury
Regulation'" that defines a business league as one that promotes a "line
of business", as opposed to a "group in competition with another within an
industry." The tax exemption for business leagues, chambers of commerce,
and boards of trade has been in effect since the beginning of the modem
income tax system in 1913. Unlike chambers of commerce and boards of
trade, however, the term "business league" had no settled meaning at that
time.
Regulation 1.501(c)(6)-i states that a business league is one that
directs its activity "to the improvement of business conditions or to the
promotion of the general objects of one or more lines of business as dis-
tinguished from the performance of particular services or individual persons."
Calling it the Commissioner's function, and not the judiciaries, to
choose among reasonable interpretations of a taxing statute, the majority of
the court said that the "line-of-business" requirement is well grounded in
the legislative history and purpose of the business league execption. The
legislative testimony submitted by groups that led to the adoption of the
business league exemption indicates that the exemption was meant for
organizations composed of businessmen working to promote the common
interest of all the "members of their communities of their industries.2 57 The
court further stated that Congress can be considered to have accepted the
IRS definition since, in the fifty years since its promulgation, Congress
has taken no action to change it. During this period, the term "line of
business" has been interpreted to mean either an entire industry or all
components of an industry within a geographic area.
Franchisee associations whose membership is confined to dealers of the
franchisor and whose purposes and activities are directed to the business
of that franchisor, under the Midas decision, are not entitled to an exemption
as business leagues under section 501(c) (6). This case suggests that as a
prerequisite to recognizing exemption under section 501 (c) (6), the Service
285 1968-1 C.B. 263.
256Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c)(6)-1.
257 440 U.E. at 472.
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might inquire into whether the membership of an association is industry
wide and, if not, whether due effects were being made to attract industry-wide
membership.
11.07 Type B Reorganization
The Tax Court in Reeves v. Commissioner' broke away from the
long-standing rule that a reorganization is tax free only if made "solely
for voting stock" of the acquiring corporation.259 Prior to this case, this re-
quirement has been interpreted by the courts as meaning that any cash or
other property payments will disqualify the tax-free status of a Type B
reorganization. In Reeves, the Tax Court held that cash payments won't
nullify a Type B reorganization so long as at least the required eighty percent
of the target corporation is acquired in a transaction solely for stock.
Two months after release of the Reeves opinion, the District Court of Dela-
ware decided Pierson v. United States, 260 which reached the same result
as Reeves. However, more importantly, Pierson does not appear to have
narrowed its holding to the "eighty percent solely for stock" standard ap-
plied by the Tax Court in Reeves.
A frequently used method of acquiring a corporation is the stock-for-
stock exchange commonly known as a Type B reorganization. To achieve tax-
free status, the following technical requirement stated in section 368 (a)
(I) (B) must be met:
. . . the acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely for all
or a part of its voting stock . . . of stock of another corporation, if,
immediately after the acquisition, the acquiring corporation has con-
trol of such other corporation (whether or not such acquiring corpo-
ration had control immediately before the acquisition.)
The use of cash by the acquiring corporation in any transaction deemed
to be a part of the acquisition has frequently caused an intended B re-
organization to be viewed as a taxable sale or exchange. In order to ensure
that shareholders do not abuse these nonrecognition provisions by casting
in the form of nontaxable reorganizations transactions that are basically
sales of stock, a number of conditions are imposed before nonrecognition
is available. In the "stock-for-stock" or Type B reorganization, the critical
inquiry is often whether the exchange is made "solely" for voting stock.
This strict interpretation of the word "solely" was relaxed somewhat
by the Fifth Circuit in Mills v. Commissioner.'6' In this case, three small
gas corporations were merged into a larger corporation. Rather than issue
fractional shares to make up the balance of the exchange price, the acquiring
corporation paid each shareholder $27.36 in cash to close the deal. The
Fifth Circuit reasoned that the parties intended a stock-for-stock exchange,
and the cash was merely incidental to eliminating the problem of fractional
258 71 T.C. 727 (1979). 26043 A.F.T.R. 2d 1228 (1979).
239 Id. 21 331 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1964).
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shares. However, the IRS continued to literally construe the word "solely"
in stock-for-stock exchanges.28
In Reeves, the court was confronted directly with the need to determine
the proper scope of the "solely for voting stock" requirement of section
368 (c) (1) (B). In this case, International Telephone and Telegraph Cor-
poration was interested in acquiring Hartford Fire Insurance Company, so
it proposed a merger, a stock-for-stock exchange which was completed in
May, 1970. The only question before the Tax Court was whether these trans-
actions constituted a valid B reorganization whereby a controlling interest
(80%) in the stock of a corporation is acquired "solely" for the stock of
the acquiring corporation. The Tax Court interpreted the "solely" require-
ment as applying only to the minimum amount of stock needed to obtain
control subject to a literal interpretation of the term "solely" (i.e., eighty
percent of the target corporation's stock must be obtained from shareholders
who receive only stock consideration). Such a reading of the case gives
full effect to the "solely" language of the statute while still permitting some
latitude for cash in a B reorganization. It departs from the traditional view
in that the "solely" requirement is applied only to the amount of stock
needed to obtain control as opposed to whatever stock is acquired in the
reorganization. Here, the acquisitions for cash did not coincide with the
stock-for-stock exchange.
After Reeves was decided, the District Court of Delaware in a case
involving another former Hartford shareholder (involving the same ITT-
Hartford exchange as in Reeves) reached the same result in holding that
the transaction qualified as a B reorganization. In Pierson,"' the district court
held that in a single transaction, if eighty perecent of the acquired corpora-
tion's stock is exchanged for voting stock in the acquiring corporation, it
will qualify as a B reorganization notwithstanding the payment of cash or
other nonstock consideration within the same transaction. This holding
in Pierson differs in some important aspects from the holding in Reeves,
although they both reach the same conclusion. In Pierson, the district
court's opinion was unequivocal in stating that the cash and stock were
part of the same transaction. More importantly, the district court apparently
has not narrowed its holding to the "eighty percent solely for stock" standard
applied by the Tax Court in Reeves. In fact, the Pierson case may stand
for a broader "eighty percent for stock" rule. If this is so, a transaction
would qualify as a B reorganization where eighty percent of the acquired cor-
poration's stock is acquired for stock, although some or all of the share-
holders receive cash or other nonstock consideration. It remains to be seen
whether these liberal interpretations will be followed or whether courts
will return to the traditional interpretations.
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